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Justice Byron White and the Argument that 
the Greater Includes the Lesser 
Michael Herz* 
The proposition that the greater includes the lesser is 
tremendously attractive to lawyers and judges. It satisfies the 
desire for logic, proof, and coherence. It sounds right. 
It is also a trap. That does not mean that it is always false. 
Were that so, it would not be much of a trap. It is a trap 
because it is only sometimes true. 
In this Article, I will consider Justice Byron White's use of 
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. I have two goals. The 
first is to learn something more about White; the second is t o  
learn something more about legal argument. I suggest that 
White is fond of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument,' 
which represents a style of logical reasoning that is typical of 
his opinions but is often overlooked by commentators. While 
the argument holds great appeal for White, he has for the most 
part successfully avoided its traps. 
Part I begins with some general observations on Justice 
White's jurisprudence, agreeing with the usual portrait of 
White as a pragmatic functionalist, but suggesting that that 
portrait is incomplete. White is a keenly analytic thinker who 
is interested not only in how things work in practice but also in 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; law clerk to 
Justice White, 1983 and 1984 Terms. My thanks to Susan Bandes, Eva Hanks, 
John McGinnis, and Kevin Worthen for comments on an earlier draft, to Larry 
Crocker and Abner Greene for helpful conversations, and to Eric Rethy (Cardozo 
'93) and Michael Jaffe (Cardozo '94) for very useful research. 
1. Early drafts of this Article fluctuated hopelessly between the present and 
past tense when discussing Justice White's opinions. His retirement from the 
Supreme Court suggested that the past tense was correct, but using it did not 
come naturally and I frequently lapsed into the more reassuring present tense. I 
then came to the happy realization that because Justice White continues his 
judicial activity, sitting by designation on the Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., 114 S. 
Ct. No. 8, at cliii (1994) (designating Justice White to sit on the Tenth Circuit 
from March 14 through March 18, 1994), use of the present tense remains correct 
except when specifically referring to his Supreme Court tenure. 
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how they hold together in theory. Part I1 discusses the contours 
and limitations of the logical proposition that the greater 
includes the lesser. Part I11 then applies that discussion to 
White opinions that invoke the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument. 
A. Legal Functionalism 
Most accounts of Byron White's jurisprudence emphasize 
White's pragmatic functionalism. For example, Alan Ides' in- 
sightful recent essay portrays White as the inheritor of the 
legal realism preached at the Yale Law School when he was a 
student there, eschewing formalist distinctions and blindered 
doctrinalism in favor of a pragmatic, functionalist consideration 
of real-world  circumstance^.^ 
In a similar vein, Lance Liebman writes of White: 
His job, as he saw it, was to decide cases: to read the briefs, 
to question the lawyers rigorously, to find the flaws in general 
statements about the law, and to see, as far as  humanly pos- 
sible, the consequences of each decision and its supporting 
rationale. Thus his powedul intelligence was largely focused 
on predicting, skeptically, the consequences of conclusion and 
reason-the consequences for other applications of a rule, and 
the real-world consequences of a Supreme Court de~ision.~ 
The separation-of-powers dissents-Buckley v. Valeo; 
Bowsher v. Synar,' Northern Pipeline Construction Co. u. Mar- 
athon Pipe Line Co.; Metropolitan Washington Airports Au- 
thority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,? 
2. Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419 
(1993). 
3. Lance Liebman, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
13, 14 (1993); see also Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 
103 YALE L.J. 19, 19 (1993) (noting that "[tlo the distress of those who would have 
preferred greater elaboration of a philosophical vision, he approached the judicial 
task in a lawyerly and pragmatic fashion"). 
4. 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissepting in 
part). 
5. 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
6. 458 US. 50, 92 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). 
7. 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2312 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); see id. at 2312-13 
("Today the Court strikes down yet another innovative and otherwise lawful gov- 
ernmental experiment in the name of separation of powers."). 
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and, of course, INS u. Chadhas-are the most celebrated exam- 
ples of White's fun~tionalism.~ This approach is "realist" both 
in the jurisprudential sense and in the sense that it pays seri- 
ous attention to the real world. In a phrase of Justice Jackson's 
that White quoted more than once, the goal was to achieve not 
abstract purity or theoretical elegance but a "workable govern- 
ment."1° 
8. 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
9. See Ides, supra note 2, at  421-29; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Function- 
al Approaches to Separation-of-Powers QuestioneA Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 COR- 
NELL L. REV. 488 (1987). Indeed, here is where one finds arguably its single stark- 
est expression. In Bowsher v. Synar the majority concluded that the Comptroller 
General was subservient to Congress because he could be removed by an a d  of 
Congress. 478 US. at  727-28. For White, the removal power was a "triviality" of 
"minimal practical significance" that had "lain dormant" for six decades. Id. at 759, 
765, 771 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, "[tlhe practical result of the removal provi- 
sion is not to render the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or subservient to 
Congress, but to render him one of the most independent officers in the entire 
federal establishment." Id. at 773 (White, J., dissenting). "Realistic consideration of 
the nature of the Comptroller General's relation to Congress thus reveals that the 
threat to separation of powers conjured up by the majority is wholly chimerical." 
Id. at  774 (White, J., dissenting). In utter contrast, Chief Justice Burger wrote for 
the majority that whether in practice the Comptroller General was a pawn of Con- 
gress was simply irrelevant: "In constitutional terms, the removal powers over the 
Comptroller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress." Id. at  
730. 
White's approach in these cases was replicated in his opinions in "vertical sepa- 
ration of powersn (i.e. federalism) cases. There he also emphasized the need for 
flexibility to enable government to handle real and changing problems and defer- 
ence to better-informed branches, focusing on overall structure and displaying im- 
patience with the Court's attachment to purely formal requirements at  the expense 
of their underlying rationales. One of the purest and most explicit examples of this 
approach came during his second-to-last Term in White's partial dissent in New 
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Act required states to take title to such waste if they failed to ensure adequate 
disposal opportunities. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court struck down 
the take-title provision as an unconstitutional "commandeering" of the organs of 
state government by the feds. Taking the majority to task for its "formalistically 
rigid obeisance to 'federalism,'" id. at  2446 (White, J., concurring in part and dis- 
senting in part), White emphasized that "action, rather than rhetoric, is needed to 
solve" what had become "a crisis of national proportions," and it thus "would be 
far more sensible to defer to a coordinate branch of government ill its decision to 
devise a solution to a national problem of this kind," id. at 2444 & n.3 (White, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The upshot of the Court's opinion, he 
argued, would be at  best to force Congress to jump through additional hoops to 
achieve the same result and might well be less rather than more state decision- 
making and autonomy. Id. at 2446 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
10. The quote is from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and was invoked by White in his dissents 
in Bowsher, 478 US. at 760 (White, J., dissenting), and Chadha, 462 US. at  978 
(White, J., dissenting). 
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'White's function- and fact-oriented approach to jurispru- . 
dence,"" as Ides shows, is hardly limited to the separation of 
powers cases. To Ides' catalogue, I would add one category and 
four examples. The category is White's preference for as-applied 
rather than facial constitutional challenges.12 An as-applied 
challenge (a) is narrower than a facial challenge and (b) rests 
on hard facts about the real world rather than judicial hypothe- 
sizing about possible applications. 
My four examples concern four superficially unrelated 
cases that can be lumped together because each forced the 
Court explicitly to describe the role of judges.13 In Chisom v. 
Roemer,14 Justice White joined the Court's opinion, written by 
Justice Stevens, holding that the Voting Rights Act applies to 
elections for judges, notwithstanding the statute's application 
only t o  elections for "representatives." In Gregory v. A~hcroft,'~ 
he wrote separately, joined only by Justice Stevens, concluding 
that judges are "on the policymaking level" and therefore not 
within the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act. In Payne v. Tennessee,16 White joined the Court's opinion, 
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, overruling two recent deci- 
sions and permitting the introduction of victim-impact evidence 
in capital trials. White had dissented in the first decision," 
then made a fiRh vote to stand by that decision in the sec- 
ond,'' before returning to his original substantive position in 
11. Ides, supra note 2, at  437; see also Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense and 
the Constitution: Justice White and the Egalitarian Ideal, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 433, 
434 (1987) (describing White's judicial approach as "fundamentally pragmatic, rath- 
er than ideological, principled but nondoctrinaire"). 
12. My assertion that White had such a preference is based on impression 
more than research. For one example, however, see Reme v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 
2331 (1991). The majority dismissed without reaching the merits; Justices White 
and Marshall wrote separately, addressing the merits. Viewing the case as a facial 
challenge, Marshall would have struck the statute down, id. at 2350 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); viewing it as an as-applied challenge White would have upheld the 
statute, id. at  2342 (White, J., dissenting). 
13. I have thus lumped them together. See Michael Herz, Choosing Between 
Normative and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75 M A R Q U ~ E  L. REV. 
725 (19921, on which the following discussion draws. 
14. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). 
15. 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2408 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part; and concurring in the judgment). 
16. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
17. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). 
18. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 US. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., dissent- 
ing). 
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Payne. Finally, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,lg 
White was in a group of three Justices who concluded that 
because the Court had applied the new rule announced in a 
prior decision, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. D i a ~ , ~ ~  to the parties 
in Bacchus, fairness required that the rule be applied retroac- 
tively across the board. Three Justices would have applied the 
Bacchus rule prospectively, and three (the unusual cluster of 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia) contended that judicial deci- 
sions must always be retroactive. 
Justice White's votes in these cases are ideologically incon- 
sistent. For example, he voted for the civil rights plaintiffs in 
Chisom but against them in Gregory-unlike, say, Justices 
Blackmun and Marshall, who voted for the plaintiffs in both. 
He voted against the criminal defendant, but also against the 
big corporation, unlike most of the other Justices, who voted 
either against the criminal defendant and for the corporation or 
vice versa. He read one ambiguous federal statute to apply to  
state governments and one not to, unlike Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, who read both to 
leave the states alone. Ideology, however, is always the wrong 
criterion for evaluating or  understanding White's opinions. 
Viewed as the application of a single methodology and view of 
the judiciary, these four votes are wholly and uniquely consis- 
tent. 
Each of these cases required a choice between an idealized, 
normative version of the judicial role and a realistic, descrip- 
tive version. The one portrays courts as modest dispute resolv- 
ers, faithfully applying legal rules made by others; the other 
deems judges active lawmakers. Alone among the Justices, 
White opted for the descriptive version in each of these cas- 
es-he always chose reality over theory.21 He was one of only 
two Justices who was willing to come right out and say that 
19. 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991). 
20. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
21. In contrast, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed an essentially 
legislative role for the Court in Payne and Jim Beam, unfazed by overruling prior 
decisions or ruling prospectively, but then joined Justice O'Connor's tentative ma- 
jority opinion in Gregory (holding only that judges were not clearly not on the 
policymaking level) and in Chisom refused t o  accept that judges could be "represen- 
tatives." Justices Marshall and Blackmun painted an extraordinarily conservative 
picture of judges as wholly deferential to the policymakers in other branches, as 
absolutely bound by precedent, and as constitutionally obliged to rule retroactively, 
only to hold that these diffident dispute-resolvers were "representatives" under the 
Voting Rights Act. And so on. 
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judges are policymakers; he joined the majority that endorsed 
the "representatives" label; he saw no constitutional imperative 
of retroactive decisionmaking; and he joined a majority that 
gave short shrift to  the principles of stare decisis. In short, he 
consistently went along with an image of the judiciary that is a 
good deal closer to the model of a legislature-representative 
policymakers who decide matters prospectively and without 
regard for prior decisions-than the "official version" would 
have it.22 This version is, of course, that of the realists.23 
22. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia, the current Court's leading formalist, was 
almost as consistent in adhering to the opposite version of the judicial role. For 
him, judges are wholly unlike legislators: they are not representatives, may not 
make policy, and must decide retroactively. Scalia's vote in Payne (the one case in 
this group where he and White joined the same opinion) is the aberration on this 
account, although it is a minor one given the conflicting signals of the usual nor- 
mative version of the judicial role: adhere to precedent, but also defer to ultimate 
binding legal standards, such as those set out in the Constitution. 
23. In light of Justice White's uniquely consistent approach in these cases, I 
cannot resist offering a few words at this point on the question of White's consis- 
tency, or lack thereof. I t  is striking to what extent the standard perception is that 
White was quite inconsistent, both on the macro level (the usual charge being that 
he grew ever more conservative over the years and would have been a sore disap- 
pointment to the President who appointed him) and on the micro level (it often 
being observed that he was "unpredictable"). All former clerks have had the "isn't 
he getting more conservative" conversation a million times. And it is a standard 
observation that, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, "his judicial work defies easy 
categorization" and "no 'Byron R. White School of Jurisprudence' remains behind." 
William H. Rehnquist, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 5, 
5, 6 (1993). 
To me (and, I think, to most former clerks, see, e.g., Rex E. Lee, A Case for 
Whizzer White's' Greatness, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at 17) all this is quite mys- 
tifying. First of all, except in the area of affirmative action, see Charles Fried, A 
Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20 (1993) (noting that 
White joined opinions in affirmative action cases that were "clearly, even provoca- 
tively, inconsistent"); Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 471 (1987) (describing shifts in White's views on affvmative action), 
White did not shift noticeably to the right over the years. In the area of criminal 
procedure, where the Court was most visibly conservative over White's last decade 
on it, he merely stayed to the right, where he had begun (dissenting, for example, 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), and 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)) and where the 
Court came to join him. Indeed, when the Court lurched even further to  the right 
than he had been, he refused to go with it. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 288-95 (1991) (plurality opinion of White, J., joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (dissenting from application of harmless-error rule to 
introduction of coerced confessions). In the substantive due process area, he was 
skeptical from the start (dissenting in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting), and every abortion decision beginning with 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)) but not openly hos- 
tile (going along in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment), and consistently arguing for parental liberty interests). 
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This is not to say that White was endorsing a wide-ranging 
judicial activism. He was not, and he did not display such ten- 
dencies himself. On the other hand, for all the talk about his 
deference to the democratic process, he is not shy about inter- 
fering with it.24 And he always has frankly acknowledged the 
broad scope of the judicial power to do SO, even when he 
thought it was being unwisely exercised.25 What mattered to 
him in these cases, then, was how judges functioned in the real 
world, what they "did in fact."26 
The same description applies to his First Amendment opinions from the start. On 
the other hand (again, excepting affirmative action) he was consistently in the 
liberal camp in equal protection cases, and Voting Rights Act plaintiffs had no 
greater friend on the Court. 
Not only are these positions consistent over time, they are easily squared one 
with another. As others have described, the dominant themes are deference to 
democratically accountable andlor expert decisionmakers, an effort to ensure that 
democratic processes work effectively, scrutiny to ensure that other governmental 
players are doing their jobs correctly, and a pragmatic flexibility. 
Oddly, he was perhaps most inconsistent in his approach to consistency. That 
is, more than most Justices he would accept rulings from which he had dissented 
as binding precedent. Here and there, however, he never gave in. He was a consis- 
tent dissenter in cases involving separation of powers, abortion, and the religion 
clauses. I am not sure what determined when White accepted precedent he deemed 
wrongly decided and when he held fast to his dissenting view. My tentative specu- 
lation is that he was more likely to perpetuate a dissenting position when he was 
isolated. This seems perverse, but may reflect his strong sense of institutional 
obligation. A Justice is freer to chart his own course when the Court does not 
need him to chart its course. On White's sense of institutional obligation, see, e.g., 
Fried, supra, at 23 (noting White9s "willingness to go along to 'make a Court'-a 
subordination of personal punctilio to the goal of making the Court's work useful 
to, not to say usable by, the lower courts and the professionn); Monroe E. Price, 
White: A Justice of Studied Unpredictability, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, a t  24, 25 
(stating that White "believes deeply in performing proficiently his assignment as a 
judge on a court that can perform what is expected of itn). 
24. See Liebman, supra note 3, at  15-16 (noting examples of White's willing- 
ness to intrude on legislative choice); see also infm note 41. 
25. His dissent in Miranah provides the classic example: 
[Tbe Court is making] new law and new public policy in much the same 
way that it has in the course of interpreting other great clauses of the 
Constitution. This is what the Court . . . must do and will continue to do 
until and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional 
distribution of governmental powers. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omit- 
ted). 
26. Less strikingly, these decisions reflect a second oft-noted aspect of White's 
jurisprudence: deference to and confidence in democratic decisionmaking. Chisom is 
one of many cases in which White voted for a strong reading of the Voting Rights 
Act; Payne one of many in which he took a narrow reading of constitutional limita- 
tions on the political branches; Jim Beam one of many in which he endorsed oner- 
ous judicial remedies once a statutory or constitutional violation had been found. 
There is no shortage of examples. On this aspect of White's opinions, see Ides, 
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B. Logical Fornalism 
I wholly agree, then, with the usual account of Justice 
White's jurisprudence, as far as it goes. I also feel, however, 
that it is incomplete. It leaves out Justice White's extraordi- 
nary abilities as an abstract thinker. In his final opinion as a 
Supreme Court Justice, a partial concurrence and partial dis- 
sent in United States v. Dixon?' White criticized the 
majority's approach as having "consequences [that are] at once 
illogical and harmful."28 This phrase captures the second as- 
pect of White's judicial method: he sought t o  avoid not just 
harmful outcomes but also illogical ones. 
Notwithstanding White's disdain for ungrounded theoriz- 
ing:' and legal functionalist though he may have been, he 
was in many ways a logical formalist. His pragmatism may 
have led to or at least is part of the first; his analytic abilities 
and interest in argument led to or at least are part of the sec- 
ond. 
While perhaps he is "as far as you can get from [being] 
flamboyant, dramatic or even eloquent,'"' Byron White is, to 
use a phrase he often applies to  others, "smart as hell." This is 
a recurrent and unsurprising theme of the recollections of for- 
mer clerks. For example, Bill Nelson notes Justice White's 
"extraordinary analytical ability" and states that "[iln my expe- 
rience as his law clerk, I found that Justice White could identi- 
fy the weaknesses and gaps in any theoretical argu~nent."~' 
supra note 2, at 456-58. 
27. 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2868 (1993) (White, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
28. Id. at 2877 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
29. In addition to the sources cited above, see supra notes 2-3 and accompa- 
nying text, consider this typical expression of such exasperation: "Surely, even at 
the extreme level of abstraction at  which the Court operates in its opinion, the 
majority can recognize a difference between the scope and dangers of [laws that 
had been struck down in prior cases], and Lakewood's more focused regulation." 
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US. 750, 787 (1988) (White, 
J., dissenting); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 US. 490, 521 
(1981) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (stating that the dissent's "position makes 
little sense even abstractly"). 
30. Donald W. Hoagland, Byron White as a Practicing Lazuyer in Colorado, 58 
U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 366 (1987). 
31. William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the Consti- 
tutional Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U. COLO. L '2EV. 347, 348 
(1987). Judge David Ebel, another former clerk, notes that Justice White "simply 
does not need much processing time t o  absorb and integrate information. A brief 
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The Justice has an "analytic bent of mind"32 and admires and 
possesses the debater's facility with argument.33 
Others who have tussled with him share this impression. 
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried writes: 
It  is not possible to have seen Justice White in the courtroom, 
to have argued before him, without getting a sense of a strong 
intelligence. He knew the case. He had worked out its intrica- 
cies-he obviously loves a puzzle. He delighted in asking just 
the question that displayed a weakness the advocate was try- 
ing to skate over, or perhaps had not even noticed. "Skewer" 
is the word that comes to mind,34 
It would be odd if this analytical skill and inclination did' 
not in some way surface in his jurisprudence. I think it does. 
Consider one example by way of introduction. Justice White 
shows a particular thoughtfulness about means/ends tests, 
often focusing on whether a particular rule or statute served its 
stated purposes. In a number of the Warren Court individual 
statement travels fully clothed into his consciousness with all of the trappings of 
nuance, comparison, structure, and context that, for most of us, require articulated 
analysis and, even more importantly, time." David M. Ebel, A Tribute to Justice 
Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 8, 11 (1993). 
32. Stith, supra note 3, at 19. 
33. As Lance Liebman wrote more than two decades ago, ''White is a brilliant 
lawyer, quick and imaginative a t  seeing and making arguments." Lance Liebman, 
Swing Man on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1972, 8 6 (Magazine), a t  16, 
17. It has always been my impression that a disproportionate number of his law 
clerks were on the debate team at some point. One former clerk recalls: 
The Justice was the consummate debater. No one could ever accuse 
him of political correctness in his thinking. I marvelled at his nimble 
mind, command of history, and willingness to push the outside of the 
envelope to test his acolytes' glib assumptions. I have never met anyone 
who could so cogently and ~conornically marshal the fads and law. 
Our debates were nothing if not intense. Arguing with the Justice was 
like taking the bar examination in a hurricane. The man who graduated 
first in his high school, college, and law school classes used all of his 
awesome intellectual powers to make his points. 
Pierce O'Do~ell ,  The Hands of Justice: A Law Clerk Fondly Remembers Byron R. 
White, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 12, 17 (1993). 
34. Fried, supra note 23, at 22. Fried's predecessor Erwin Griswold ascribes 
White's "appearance of brusqueness" to the fad that "his mind is so clear and 
quick." Erwin N. Griswold, Reflections on Justice White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 339, 
346 (1987); see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice Byron White: The Consistent Curmud- 
geon, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at 1, 30 ('White's personal crustiness is that of 
a man of enormous intelligence-a Rhodes Scholar who was at the top of his Yale 
Law School class and who arguably boasts as much sheer intellectual horsepower 
as anyone on the Courtwho seemingly cannot be bothered to spend much effort 
seeking to persuade others to his point of view."). 
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liberties cases, for example, Justice White went along with the 
result, but focused on means and ends, without joining in any 
sweeping statements about the Constitution. Thus, in Griswold 
v. Conne~t icu t~~ White voted with the majority. While ac- 
knowledging an unenumerated privacy right as part of a sub- 
stantive due process liberty interest, his opinion was directed 
primarily to whether the ban on the use of contraceptives by 
married couples would in fact further the stated goal: 
I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by 
married couples in any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit 
sexual relationships. . . . 
. . . Perhaps the theory is that the flat ban on use prevents 
married people from possessing contraceptives and without the 
ready availability of such devices for use in the marital rela- 
tionship, there will be no or less temptation to use them in 
extramarital ones. This reasoning rests on the premise that 
married people will comply with the ban in regard to their 
marital relationship, notwithstanding total nonenforcement in  
this context and apparent nonenforcibility, but will not comply 
with criminal statutes prohibiting extramarital affairs and the 
anti-use statute in respect to illicit sexual relationships, a 
premise whose validity has not been demonstrated and whose 
intrinsic validity is not very evident.36 
This is not just a "let's look a t  the real world, folks" opinion. It 
is carefully reasoned, somewhat abstract, and logically complex. 
White's concern is whether the state's argument holds together 
on its face. 
Close examination of the means and ends can be seen in 
his opinion in United States v. Leon:' which established a 
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule under which 
evidence obtained in good faith by a police officer reasonably 
relying on an invalid warrant is admissible. White, never en- 
thusiastic about the exclusionary rule, had advocated such an 
exception for some time before a majority joined him in 
Leon.38 The reasoning in Leon rests not on empirical investi- 
35. 381 US. 479 (1965). 
36. Id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
37. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
38. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266 (1983) (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissent- 
ing). 
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gation but on a theory about the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule and the circumstances in which that purpose will be 
served by excluding illegally obtained evidence. For White, the 
critical point was that "[plenalizing the officer for the 
magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically con- 
tribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment ~iolations."~~ 
The same attention to the meandends connection is seen 
in White's willingness, probably somewhat greater than that of 
most Justices:' to strike down laws under rational basis scru- 
tiny:' and in his well-known opinion in the air-bags case."2 
In all these examples, I would suggest, something more 
than "functionalism" or "legal realism" is at work. White is 
neither a policy wonk in robes, nor an Earl Warren, nor a Lou- 
is Brandeis (the brief-writer or the Justice). He is an exception- 
ally intelligent and keenly analytic thinker who seeks logical 
coherence in legal argument and in judicial opinions. His juris- 
prudence is shaped as much by that latter commitment as it is 
39. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (emphasis added). The same logical analysis of the 
incremental deterrent effect of suppression appears in White's opinion for the Court 
in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19-21 (1990) (refusing to suppress incriminat- 
ing statement made by defendant a t  police station after warrantless entry and 
arrest at the defendant's home). 
40. Liebman, supra note 3, at  15 & n.8. 
41. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); 
Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 
(1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); New York City Transit Auth. v. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 597 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441, 456, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (voting to strike down 
schedule of tuition fees for state university because of its "bizarre pattern of dis- 
crimination" rather than the majority's irrebuttable presumption theory); San Anto- 
nio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
These cases might be seen as counter-examples to White's oft-noted confidence 
in the democratic process and deference to legislative judgments. See, e.g., Rhesa 
H. Barksdale, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARv. L. REV. 3, 6 (1993) 
("His opinions reflect his unwavering confidence and faith in our majoritarian, 
democratic system. He understands the limited role of the courts, especially the 
federal courts, in that system, feeling confident that the affairs of our nation are 
best managed by its people and their elected representatives."); Stith, supra note 3, 
a t  24-25 (noting examples of "White's clear sense of the primacy of democratic 
institutions"). Yet an important consequence of striking a law down as irrational 
under the Equal Protection Clause (rather than applying heightened scrutiny or 
discovering a fundamental right) is that it leaves the legislature free to do almost 
exactly the same thing again in the future. While striking down a law may be 
meddlesome, if you are going to strike it down the least meddlesome way of doing 
so is by using the rational basis standard under the Equal Protection Clause. 
42. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass9n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
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by pragmatism and concern for how things work in pra~tice.4~ 
The attention to the connection between means and ends re- 
flects three characteristics of his jurisprudence: (1) the prag- 
matic, consequentialist functionalism, which is so often noted; 
(2) the inclination to rule narrowly and with regard to the 
specific case before him, which is also often noted; and (3) the 
rigorous, abstract, intellectually precise concern for logical 
coherence. It is this last element that is often overlooked. 
The remainder of this Article addresses a particular mani- 
festation of this tendency, what one might call an intellectual 
rather than a legal formalism. That is White's use, or, as the 
case may be, rejection, of the purely logical proposition that the 
greater includes the lesser. 
11. THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER 
The central argument that Congress can restrict the juris- 
diction of the lower federal courts-for example, by denying 
them jurisdiction in cases concerning school prayer or abor- 
tion-is that the Constitution leaves it up to Congress whether 
there shall be such courts at This argument, which has 
been around for a long is an archetypal example of the 
argument that the greater includes the lesser. The claim is 
that the greater power-not to create the courts in the first 
place, or, presumably, to  eliminate them altogether, thus strip- 
ping them of all jurisdiction-includes the lesser power of strip- 
ping them .of some jurisdi~tion.~~ 
43. I take Dennis Hutchinson to be adverting to the same twin aspects of 
Justice White's approach when he notes that two "hallmarks" of White opinions are 
that "practical interests defeat hypothetical risks, and doctrinal structure is logical- 
ly applied." Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, 103 
YALE L.J. 43, 53 (1993). 
44. Article 111 provides for "one supreme Court, and . . . such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. 111, 
0 1. 
45. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). 
46. The Supreme Court has largely avoided this imbroglio. However, Justice 
White laid out a close cousin of this argument in Palmore v. United States, 411 
U.S. 389 (1973). There a criminal defendant, convicted in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court in a trial presided over by a D.C. judge without life tenure, argued 
that criminal prosecutions under the D.C. criminal code were federal questions that 
could be heard only by Article 111 judges. The Court held that even though the 
D.C. criminal code was a federal law, prosecutions thereunder did not have t o  take 
place in federal court. Part of the rationale was that Congress did not have to 
create inferior courts or invest them with the entire jurisdiction authorized by 
Article 111. If it did not, i t  might still adopt criminal statutes, violations of which 
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The greater-includes-the-lesser argument is particularly 
associated with Justice Holmes?' In one of its purest expres- 
sions, Holmes wrote that "[elven in the law the whole generally 
includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit 
with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain 
way."48 Note the opening "even in  the law9'-the life of the law 
may well have been experience rather than logic, but perhaps 
not by much. Logic still counts. Indeed, perhaps nowhere did 
Holmes more refute his most famous aphorism than in his 
frequent reliance on the argument that the greater includes the 
lesser.49 
would then be prosecuted in the state courts with non-tenured judges. Such an 
outcome would be indistinguishable from what happened here. Id. at  401-02. 
47. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights", 33 UCLA L. REV. 
977, 1011 11.87 (1986) (describing Holmes as the "leading spokesman" for the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument); Charles R. Bogle, Note, "Unconscionable" 
Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 193, 197 n.14 (1994) (describing Holmes as "the greatest proponent 
of this view"). Indeed, Holmes' affection for this view is sufficient to induce Cass 
Sunstein to label it "Holmesianism." Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, 
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 597 (1990). 
48. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 US.  1, 53 (1910) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
In Western Union, the Court struck down a Kansas statute that conditioned the 
State's permission for a foreign corporation to do business in the State on the 
corporation's willingness to pay a discriminatory tax based on the corporation's 
entire capital stock rather than just its in-state assets. See also Pullman Co. v. 
Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 US. 56 (1910). The greaterAesser principle had been 
more successhlly invoked in earlier foreign corporations cases. See, e.g., Doyle v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) (holding that State could withdraw 
business license because corporation had invoked federal court's diversity jurisdic- 
tion; "[ilf the State has the power to cancel the license . . . [ilt has the power to 
determine for what causes and in what manner the revocation shall be made"). 
Western Union is a prominent early application of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, which rejects the greaterAesser principle. 
49. A few other examples are worth citing. In the well-known case of Com- 
monwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), af'd, 167 US.  43 (1897), Holmes 
upheld a conviction for speaking on the Boston Common without a permit. "[Tlhe 
legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by 
putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less [sic] step 
of limiting the public use to certain purposes." Id. a t  113; see also Ferry v. 
Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88, 94-95 (1928) (Holmes, J.); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n, 271 US. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); McAuliffe v. 
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). In Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the Court struck down congressional 
limits on the President's authority to remove a postmaster, Holmes' dissent cen- 
tered on the fad  that Congress could eliminate the position of postmaster altogeth- 
er: 
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Holmes is hardly the only Justice to have embraced this 
reasoning. Among contemporary Justices, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist seems to be its most enthusiastic endor~er,~'  but he 
is far from alone.51 
We have to deal with an office that owes its existence to Congress 
and that Congress may abolish tomorrow. Its duration and the pay at- 
tached to it while i t  lasts depend on Congress alone. . . . With such pow- 
er over its own creation, I have no more trouble in believing that Con- 
gress has power to prescribe a term of life for i t  free from interfer- 
ence than I have in accepting the undoubted power of Congress to decree 
its end. 
Id. at 177. 
Even Holmes, however, drew the line somewhere. When the Court upheld the 
Postmaster General's revocation of second-class mailing privileges for a pro-German 
newspaper, Holmes dissented: "The United States may give up the Post Office 
when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much 
a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." United States ex rel. Mil- 
waukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
50. Bogle, supra note 47, at  199 11.21. A brief catalogue: (1) Given the state's 
greater power to ban gambling altogether, it necessarily has the lesser authority to 
forbid advertising of legal gambling. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 
U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.). (2) Given that the state need not offer a 
person employment a t  all and could hire only at-will employees, it has the lesser 
authority to limit the permissible bases for termination but rely on sketchy proce- 
dures to determine if such a basis exists. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 
(1974) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (stating that employees "must take the 
bitter with the sweet" in accepting for-cause employment with limited due process 
protections). (3) If a plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer and then wins a small- 
er amount after a trial must pay the defendant's post-settlement-offer costs, then 
one who rejects the offer and loses altogether must pay those costs. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticiz- 
ing the Court for "[tlotally ignoring the common-sense maxim that the greater 
includes the lesser"); see also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 177 (1980) ("Because Congress could have eliminated windfall benefits for all 
classes of employees, it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to have 
drawn lines between groups of employees for the purpose of phasing out those ben- 
efits."). The United States Law Week records the following recent exchange between 
the Chief Justice and the attorney defending a city ordinance that forbids virtually 
all signs: 
Why would a rule of one sign per house violate our precedents? Chief 
- - 
Justice Rehnquist asked. 
The government would be imposing a choice on residents as to which 
issue they may speak on, Cherrick responded. 
It's better to speak on one issue than none, isn't it? Should you pro- 
hibit debate entirely instead? Rehnquist asked. 
62 U.S.L.W. 3567, 3568 (Mar. 1, 1994) (reporting oral argument in Ladue v. Gilleo, 
NO. 92-1856). 
51. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (reason- 
ing that because Tribe had power to exclude non-members from the reservation 
altogether it necessarily had the power to regulate their use of the land through 
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Despite its prevalence and appeal, the argument that the 
greater includes the lesser must be used cautiously. Carelessly 
invoked, it can cover up significant problems. 
First, the argument obviously is only valid if in fact the 
greater power exists. Otherwise the major premise disappears 
and the argument fails by its own terms. The danger of a false 
assertion of such a power is not imaginary. After all, the argu- 
ment rests on a claim about a hypothetical case not before the 
court. I t  carries with it all the risks of deciding without briefs, 
arguments, or a concrete set of facts. Put differently, the argu- 
ment is one form of proceeding by hypothetical, a style of legal 
reasoning that has largely fallen out of favor.52 Furthermore, 
the supposed greater power may be more theoretical than real. 
Seth Kreimer has objected to the Holmesian analysis on the 
ground that it too often relies on an asserted greater power 
that  would never actually be exercised in  the real world. In  
these circumstances, the government is in every meaningfd 
way aggrandizing its power; the supposedly greater power is 
actually the lesser, since it is in reality ~ n a v a i l a b l e . ~ ~  
I am not certain the practical unavailability of the greater 
option is as significant as Kreimer contends. I t  is more a polit- 
ical than a legal argument. In certain circumstances, those 
challenging a particular exercise of government authority will 
happily call the government's bluff, willing to run the (mini- 
zoning); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) (Scalia, J.) 
(reasoning that "the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the 
house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the 
power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a conces- 
sion of property rights, that serves the same end"); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 
U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (O 'Co~or ,  J.) (reasoning that since the State could have 
required a driver to take a blood-alcohol test, it can give the driver the option to 
refuse the test but with the result that his license is revoked and the refusal is 
introduced in evidence); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (Blackmun, 
J.) (reasoning that since Congress could preemptively have regulated the entire 
field of natural gas regulation, it can take the less intrusive approach of allowing 
states to regulate on condition that they comply with various federal requirements). 
52. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Death of the Hypothetical, 9 STAN. LIT. REV. 125 
(1992). 
53. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights 
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1313-14 (1984). Kreimer labels this 
the argument's most "fundamental failing." Id. at  1313. Though Holmes does not 
spell i t  out, the unlikelihood of the exercise of the greater power may underlie his 
unusual rejection of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument with respect to limita- 
tions on the use of the U.S. mails. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social 
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dis- 
senting); supra note 49. 
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mal) risk that the government will exercise its theoretical pow- 
er to make them even worse off than by the exercise of the 
lesser power. This is rather like the prosecutor who chooses not 
to have the jury instructed as to a lesser included offense, pre- 
dicting that it is unlikely to  convict on the offense charged and 
not wanting to  give it any other option than acquittal. Just as 
the mere fact that the attorney is willing to  run the risk does 
not mean that the jury cannot convict of the offense charged, so 
it is not clear why the unlikelihood that the government would 
exercise its greater power means it is unable to exercise the 
lesser. Even if the greater power has disappeared for all practi- 
cal purposes, why did it take the lesser with it? If the question 
is whether the Constitution constrains certain activity (the 
lesser), the fact that non-constitutional considerations constrain 
other, greater measures is beside the point.54 
The second obvious error in relying on the greater-in- 
cludes-the-lesser argument occurs when one proposition is not 
in fact "the lesser" of the other. In set-theoretic terms, the 
greater includes the lesser if all A's are also B's, in which case 
A is a subset of B. But if in fact not all A's are B's, then A is 
simply not a subset of B, and "greater" and "lesser" 
misdescribes their relationship. Such a difficulty might arise in 
the legal setting in determining, for example, whether some- 
thing is a lesser included offense. If in fact not every element of 
the one must be shown to prove the other, then it is not.55 
54. As John Garvey writes: 
The problem with [the argument that the "greater" option is not in 
practice available] is that it confuses "ought" with "can." . . . Think about 
the ultra vires doctrine . . . . The charter of X Corporation permits it to 
boycott Y Corporation, but X's board of directors would never agree to 
such a proposal. The board would agree to buy from Y only at a lower 
price. Is this proposal ultra vires? Probably not. If boycotts are OK, less 
drastic measures probably are too. It is a question of what the charter 
allows. The board's approval has no bearing on that question. 
John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
209, 216 (1989). 
I also note that this argument has not been made, to my knowledge, in the 
debate over congressional limitations on federal jurisdiction, where it would most 
obviously apply. After all, Congress simply is not going to eliminate the lower 
federal courts-in practical terms, it c a ~ o t  do so. But no one has argued that this 
in and of itself precludes limiting their jurisdiction. Instead, the argument is over 
the courts' essential role in the constitutional plan, or the fact that elimination of 
the courts would amount to denial of the substantive rights that the courts now 
stand ready to vindicate. These are arguments that the greater power does not 
exist even on paper, albeit for some of the same reasons that it does not exist in 
practice. 
55. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989); In re Niel- 
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The third trap of this argument-another way in which the 
lesser is not in fact a subset of the greater-is what logicians 
call the fallacy of composition, or its flip-side, the fallacy of 
division.56 The fallacies arise because a set-theoretic approach 
is not always valid. In set theory, components or elements of 
the set do not interact; they are unaffected by being grouped 
together. In the real world this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, sodium chloride is a harmless substance (table salt). 
But that does not mean that either sodium or chlorine is harm- 
less; because of their interaction the components do not neces- 
sarily share the characteristics of the whole, and vice versa.57 
In the legal setting, the fallacies of composition and divi- 
sion tend t o  take a slightly different form than in abstract log- 
ic. The character of components may not change through inter- 
action, but the basic point remains that the parts do not neces- 
sarily share the characteristics of the whole. In particular, the 
greater may not include the lesser because exercise of the "less- 
er" power implicates constitutional considerations not present 
in the exercise of the "greater" power. In law, this tends to be 
true in one of two separate ways. The first involves situations 
we tend to think of as equal protections problems, the second 
involves "unconstitutional conditions." 
As t o  the first, in many settings adopting a lesser rather 
than a greater measure will raise equality concerns. Consider 
the frequent judicial statements, echoing the greater-includes- 
the-lesser proposition, that the Equal Protection Clause is not 
violated by underinclusive regulation because the legislature 
can proceed one step at a time.58 This is a significant over- 
statement. For example, to further its legitimate interests in 
reducing traffic congestion, automobile accidents, and air pollu- 
sen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). 
56. See STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING 171-73 
(2d ed. 1984). 
57. Id. The conclusion about the harmlessness of sodium and chlorine is an 
example of the fallacy of division. The fallacy of composition here would be the 
conclusion that sodium chloride is harmful because sodium and chlorine are. Anoth- 
er example of the latter fallacy would be the conclusion that because each individ- 
ual can decide how she will act, the human race can decide how it will act, for 
example by selecting a rate of population growth or choosing between war and 
peace. J.L. Mackie, Fallacies, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 169, 173 
(Paul Edwards ed., reprint ed. 1972). 
58. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 
(1949) ("It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus 
be eradicated or none at all."). 
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tion, the legislature could forbid anyone to  own an automobile. 
That does not mean, however, that it could forbid women and 
not men to own automobiles, notwithstanding the fact that do- 
ing so would be a step toward these same permissible goals. 
This "one step" toward the solution violates an independent 
constitutional principle of equal treatment.5g This is not the 
case if the state attacks the worst aspects of the problem first, 
as indeed it does by criminalizing drunk driving and outlawing 
especially dirty cars through the adoption of emissions stan- 
dards. 
The second type of problem is more complicated. Under the 
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," already "venerable" a 
generation ago,60 the state may not (at least it may not with- 
out a compelling interest) condition a benefit-welfare, re- 
search funds, employment-on the recipient's not exercising a 
constitutional right? Not all applications of the greater-in- 
cludes-the-lesser argument involve unconstitutional conditions, 
and not all arguably unconstitutional conditions trigger the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument. Nonetheless, if the great- 
er includes the lesser, then there should be no doctrine of un- 
constitutional conditions. As we have seen,62 this was Justice 
Holmes' view. To quote his most famous non-liberal First 
Amendment comment: "The petitioner may have a constitution- 
al right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to  be 
a p~liceman."~~ In other words, since New Bedford had no ob- 
ligation to hire McAuliffe at all (alternatively, he had no right 
59. Many other examples of this general equality principle are possible: a 
state need not use grand juries, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975), but if 
it does it cannot select the jurors in a racially discriminatory manner, Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979); a state need not (at least in theory) provide 
appellate review of judicial decisions, but if it does so it cannot deny appellate 
review to certain types of litigants, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 125 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); a state need not elect government oflticials, but if it 
does, it is severely limited in how it can restrict the franchise, Kramer v. Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
60. See John D. French, Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 
50 GEO. L.J. 234, 234 (1961) (referring to "the venerable doctrine of unconstitu- 
tional conditions"). 
61. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 US. 364 (1984); Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 11.13 (1976) (plurality opinion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
62. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
63. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see 
also cases cited supra note 49. 
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to city employment), then surely it could offer him the job con- 
ditioned on his agreeing not to talk politics. The arrangement 
only puts McAuliffe in a better position than he had been in, 
and the State has not compelled him to forgo his constitutional 
rights. The Holmes position has fallen out of favor, however. As 
long as one concedes that some conditions are unconstitutional, 
and there is unanimous agreement as to  that, though huge dis- 
agreement as to why and which ones, then the greater does not 
always include the lesser. 
My goal is not to  elaborate a theory of unconstitutional 
conditions; we are adequately supplied with those already.64 
More narrowly, we can discuss why the simple assertion of the 
principle that the greater includes the lesser is not a satisfacto- 
ry response to  the argument that a condition is unconstitution- 
al. The basic reason is that there is a qualitative difference that 
is ignored by the quantitative perspective of the greater-in- 
dudes-the-lesser. The logical defect was explained in Thomas 
Reed Powell's 1916 article, The Right to Work for the State.65 
Rejecting the Holmesian position regarding regulation of for- 
eign corporations, Powell explained that the power to exclude 
out-of-state corporations from doing business in the state at all 
64. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory 
of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL . REV. 1185 (1990); Richard A. Ep- 
stein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State 
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kreimer, supra note 
53; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 
(1989); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See generally Unconstitutional 
Conditions Symposium, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989). 
I t  may be that there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions doc- 
trine as such. Cass Sunstein asked in the title of one article whether there was. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an  Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 337 (1989). He entitled his next article Why the Unconstitutional Condi- 
tions Doctrine Is an Anachronism, see Sunstein, supra note 47, implicitly answering 
the question raised by the first. In the second article, Sunstein accepts the exis- 
tence of such a doctrine, but only to argue that it should be abandoned. In fact 
there is nothing to abandon but a label. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
does not exist as such, any more than there is a "doctrine of unconstitutional con- 
gressional arrogation of power" or a "doctrine of unconstitutional fines." In some 
circumstances, certain conditions are unconstitutional. As Sunstein states, "[a] wel- 
fare program limited to Democrats is unconstitutional because of the first amend- 
ment; points about voluntary participation and the 'greater power' are simply a 
diversion. Courts do not need an unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to 
make the necessary response." Id. at 606 (footnote omitted); see also Westen, supra 
note 47, at 986. 
65. Thomas R. Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 
99, 111 (1916). 
246 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
does not "include" the power to allow such corporations to do 
business subject to whatever condition the state chooses to 
impose. Powell illustrated the fallacy syllogistically: 
Mqjor Premise. There is  a class of corporations "A" (for- 
eign corporations doing intra-state commerce) over which the 
state has the power of absolute exclusion. 
Minor Premise. The X corporation is  an "A" corporation. 
Conclusion. Therefore the X corporation is  one upon 
which the state has power to impose any burden whatsoev- 
The logical defect here, explains Powell, is the "fallacy of 
four terms": the predicate in the major premise is different 
from the predicate in the conclusion. Moreover, the relation 
between the two is not that of a whole and its parts; not every 
member of the class of "imposing any burden whatsoever" is a 
member of the class of "absolutely e~cluding."~' 
Though he does not distinguish them, Powell is identifying 
two sorts of defects of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. 
One is that  the actions identified as the "parts" are not in fact 
all within the whole. The second is that while the challenged 
action may indeed be a "part" of a permissible "whole," an inde- 
pendent constitutional prohibition may apply to the part and 
not the whole. For example, Powell observes that just because 
the state might impose the death penalty for treason does not 
mean it can impose a lesser but cruel and unusual punishment 
such as torture? Here the point is that there is a qualitative 
66. Id. at  110. 
67. Id. at  111. 
68. Id. at  108 n.22, 111 11.31. This example is more complex than Powell 
indicates, and nicely illustrates the qualitative/quantitative distinction. On the one 
hand, one could argue that Powell's premise is mistaken: torture is not "less" than 
capital punishment. We know that precisely because the relevant standard-the 
Eighth Amendmentis  itself essentially quantitative, proscribing the extreme pun- 
ishments. On this view, if indeed torture violates the Eighth Amendment and the 
death penalty does not, that means that execution is lesser and torture greater ac- 
cording to the relevant yardstick and Powell's argument is wrong. On the other 
hand, one could say that the Eighth Amendment, with its concern with what is 
"cruel and unusual," is concerned with the character of punishment, not its 
amount. Certain bizarre punishments would be forbidden even if everyone agreed 
they were milder than other permissible punishments, in which case Powell's argu- 
ment works quite well. 
Powell's real point, incidentally, is not about a constraint such as the Eighth 
Amendment a t  all; it is about equality. His broader argument is that the fact that 
a state might forgo public works projects and not hire anyonetha t  is, there is no 
right to state employment as such-does not mean that the Equal Protection 
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difference between the "greater" and the "lesser" that, whatever 
their quantitative relation, means that only the latter impli- 
cates a constitutional p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~  
Let us restate these points about equal protection and 
unconstitutional conditions in the language of the greater-in- 
cludes-the-lesser argument. Even where the greater power 
undeniably exists and the lesser is undeniably a subset or part 
thereof, there are three ways in  which the "lesser" may in  fact 
be the "greater." 
First, and most important, the consequences of the "lesser7' 
step may in fact exceed those of the greater or trigger constitu- 
tional concerns absent in the case of the exercise of the greater 
power. For example, allowing men to drive but not women 
looks "lesser7' in that it denies cars to some rather than all, but 
it becomes greater when we also consider the harms it imposes 
other than denying cars. A stigmatic and practical harm to 
women occurs not from being denied cars per se, but from be- 
ing denied cars when men are allowed to have them. This may 
make the total harm greater than would result from an  across- 
the-board ban. Similarly, to borrow one of Seth Kreimer's ex- 
amples, consider the difference between a municipality's deci- 
sion to maintain whites-only swimming pools and its decision 
to have no swimming pools a t  all. While the latter superficially 
looks like the exercise of a "greater7' power, its negative conse- 
quences are in fact "lesser." The harm to blacks from being 
selectively excluded would be greater than the benefit to whites 
of being able to swim." This is most obviously an equal pro- 
Clause is inapplicable to discriminatory state hiring decisions. See id. at 104-12, 
especially 108. 
69. Although the examples in this Article will primarily involve questions of 
constitutional authority, that reflects the Supreme Court's docket more than an 
inherent characteristic of the argument. For example, consider the problem of the 
good samaritan. The greater-includes-the-lesser argument would be that if you 
c a ~ o t  be held liable for refusing to go to someone's aid at  all, you cannot be held 
liable for going to  the person's aid and botching the job. The greater indifference 
would include the lesser. Yet the common-law rule is the opposite. The usual justi- 
fication is that by going to someone's assistance, the samaritan may discourage 
others from doing so and induce reliance by the victim; therefore it becomes more 
important that the samaritan assist properly than that he assist at  all. Put in 
terms of the greater including the lesser: there is a qualitative difference between 
the "greater" and the "lesser," since only the latter affirmatively denies the victim 
assistance she might otherwise receive. Similarly, the common law imposes liability 
if the defendant, though under no obligation to act, acts negligently and leaves the 
plaintiff in a worse situation. Here the greaternesser argument does not apply be- 
cause inaction would have been "lesser." 
70. Kreimer, supra note 53, at  1312-13; see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
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tection point-indeed, it is a costbenefit justification for the 
Equal Protection Clause. But a case such as Sherbert u. 
Verr~er,~* involving the Free Exercise Clause, could be ana- 
lyzed in the same way.72 Similarly, making content-based dis- 
tinctions as to  what speech to  allow may have more serious 
consequences by skewing the market, than would an exercise of 
the "greater" power of an across-the-board ban, which elimi- 
nates more speech but does so neutrally. 
The second way in which the "lesser" may be "greater" or 
a t  least different turns on the nature of the two. Because it is 
unacceptably dangerous to drive either very fast or very slow, 
superhighways have both a minimum and maximum speed 
limit. Knowing that the speed limit is 55, one might argue that 
because the greater includes the lesser it must be permissible 
to drive 30. This is false. Concerns inapplicable to the greater 
conduct forbid the "lesser." By the same token, i t  would be a 
similar, and similarly invalid, greaterflesser argument to say 
that since 40 is fast enough, 80 must be as well. The point is 
that a separate set of concerns renders the greater and the 
lesser apples and oranges, even though they look like big ap- 
ples and little apples. In many cases an independent constitu- 
tional prohibition, such as the Free Exercise clause in Sherbert, 
will prohibit the exercise of a "lesser" power. 
The third way in which the argument breaks down turns 
on the government's justifications for its actions. Even where 
the act truly is lesser in its effect on the individual, we must 
still inquire whether the state's interests are as strong as those 
supporting exercise of the greater power. For example, it can be 
argued that if Congress can legislate substantively in a particu- 
lar area, then it may take the milder step of simply providing a 
federal forum for state-created rights in that area. In Textile 
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,73 Justice Frank- 
furter rejected this reasoning. "Surely the truly technical re- 
strictions of Article I11 are not met or respected by a beguiling 
phrase that the greater power here must necessarily include 
U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding city's decision to close rather than integrate its swim- 
ming pools). Palmer is discussed at infia notes 138-139 and accompanying text. 
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down state law denying unemployment ben- 
efits to Sherbert, who had been fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath, because 
she had unjustifiably failed to accept suitable work). 
72. See Westen, supra note 47, at 1012. 
73. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
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the lesser."74 Frankfurter did not elaborate as to why the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument does not work here. At 
least part of the explanation should be that the federal interest 
in providing a forum is far greater in the case of a federal 
claim than in the case of a state claim.75 Thus, in terms of the 
intrusion on state authority, to open the federal courts to state 
claims is "less" than supplanting state law altogether, but if 
the federal interest justifying that step is proportionately even 
smaller then the first might be unconstitutional even though 
the second is not.76 
111. JUSTICE WHITE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE 
GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER 
While I have not attempted any comprehensive survey, it 
is my impression that Justice White is attracted to the argu- 
ment that the greater includes the lesser. The argument ap- 
pears in some of his best-known and strongest opinions. For 
example, it is at the center of his dissent in Chadha: 
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to indepen- 
dent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand 
Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on 
legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies re- 
ceiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power 
74. Id. at 474 (Frarkfbrter, J., dissenting). 
75. Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 933, 961 11.134 (1982). 
76. Peter Westen offers a different example of the same reasoning. In Bagley 
v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit held that a state 
may condition a prisoner's parole on his agreeing not to travel to his home town. 
Since the state could simply keep him in prison, thus denying him any freedom of 
movement a t  all, it surely had the lesser power to let him out of prison but not 
allow him to go to one place. Westen points out, however, that the question here 
is whether the state's interests outweigh the prisoner's constitutional right to trav- 
el. The mere fact that the state could wholly infringe that right while the prisoner 
was in custody cannot be dispositive, for the state no longer has the same strong 
justification for close confinement once the parolee is out of prison. Westen, supra 
note 47, a t  994-95. 
Westen's criticism does not demonstrate that the court's result was wrong in 
this case. The state may well have powerful reasons for keeping the parolee away 
from his home town; one could imagine that doing so was a principal aim of his 
imprisonment. Westen does show, however, that the court erred in simply relying 
on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument without more. This example also im- 
plies, incidentally, that there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. The constitutional analysis is the normal balancing of individual right 
versus state interest that obtains whether or not the case is said to involve an 
unconstitutional condition. 
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may issue regulations having the force of law without bicam- 
eral approval and without the President's signature. I t  is thus 
not apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise 
of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting 
test.77 
It is the basis for his concurrence in RA.V. v. City of St. 
Paul ,78 disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that St. 
Paul could not outlaw only some fighting words: 
It  is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe 
an entire category of speech because the content of that 
speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a sub- 
set of that category differently without violating the First 
Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worth- 
less and undeserving of constitutional p ro t e~ t ion .~~  
And it pops up briefly and innocuously in many opinions along 
the way: "If there is no First Amendment privilege to refuse to  
answer the relevant and material questions asked during a 
good-faith grand jury investigation, then it is a fortiori true 
that there is no privilege to refuse to  appear before such a 
grand jury . . . . ?>SO 
There is no foolproof way of finding all the opinions in 
which Justice White relied on the argument that the greater 
includes the lesser, and deciding whether the argument has 
been invoked can be something of a judgment call. I know of 
about two-dozen such opinions; no doubt there are more. 
On the other hand, Justice White is not wedded to this 
formulation. He has ignored it in some circumstances when it 
might have been available, and rejected it when others have 
invoked it. The most prominent example is his rejection of 
Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" argument in proce- 
dural due process cases. The Rehnquist position is that because 
the state is free not to  establish a substantive entitlement (for 
example, a for-cause standard for dismissing state employees) 
in the first place, it must also be free to  create the entitlement 
but limit it by defining the procedures for its deprivation." 
77. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
78. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
79. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
80. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US.  665, 708 (1972) (White, J.). 
81. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion of 
Rehnquist, J.). 
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Justice White consistently refused to endorse this classic great- 
er-includes-the-lesser formulation, and then authored the opin- 
ion for the Court that decisively rejected it.82 
This Part analyzes a sampling of opinions in which White 
used or abjured the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. I 
should say at the outset that the focus on the use of this argu- 
ment is misleading. None of the opinions I discuss rest solely 
on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. My purpose is not 
to analyze or even give a full account of these particular opin- 
ions, but to  examine Justice White's use of a particular argu- 
ment. In any given case that argument may be only a small 
piece of his entire reasoning. 
A. Lesser Included Offenses 
In at least one setting black-letter law holds that the great- 
er includes the lesser: lesser included offenses in criminal law. 
For example, under the Double Jeopardy Clause a conviction 
for a lesser included offense bars later prosecution for the 
greater offense and vice versa.83 Determining whether an of- 
fense is jeopardy-barred involves a straightforward, set-theoret- 
ic determination of whether the quantitative relationship holds. 
The danger of a qualitative shift in the nature of the elements 
is absent. Thus, the validity of the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument hinges on whether the asserted set-theoretical rela- 
tionship holds. Justice White's opinions in this setting are 
careful and precise. 
For example, in Illinois u. vitale8* the defendant had 
caused a fatal automobile accident. Writing for the Court, Jus- 
tice White found no double jeopardy violation when the State of 
Illinois first prosecuted Vitale for failure to  reduce speed, and 
then, on the basis of the same accident, for involuntary man- 
slaughter. Because manslaughter did not necessarily entail 
proof of failure to  reduce speed, the mere possibility that the 
state would seek to rely on the elements of the lesser offense 
did not bar prosecution for the greater offense. The same sort 
of rationale underlies White's opinion in Morris u. mat hew^.'^ 
There the state appellate court, finding that the defendant had 
been convicted of a jeopardy-barred offense, reduced the convic- 
82. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
83. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164-69 (1977). 
84. 447 U.S. 410 (1980). 
85. 475 U.S. 237 (1986). 
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tion to one for a lesser included offense that was not jeopardy- 
barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the jury 
necessarily had found that the defendant's conduct satisfied all 
the elements of the lesser included offense. 
In Biles v. Watkin~,8~ as in Morris v. Mathews, a state 
appellate court had reduced a conviction to one for a supposed- 
ly lesser included offense. The defendant had been convicted of 
felony capital murder, the underlying felony being kidnapping. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court had found insufficient proof of 
the kidnapping; the felony murder conviction therefore could 
not stand, and the court instead imposed a conviction of simple 
murder on the ground that it was a lesser included offense that 
did not rest on the commission of a separate felony. The Su- 
preme Court denied certiorari. Dissenting from the denial, 
Justice White pointed out that felony capital murder may be 
committed "without any design to effect death,"87 whereas 
simple murder requires "a deliberate design to effect . . . 
death."88 The supposedly "lesser included" offense thus re- 
quired proof of an element not necessary for conviction of the 
greater offense and therefore could not be imposed by the re- 
viewing court. 
The same firm, logical analysis is present in White's dis- 
sent in the 5-4 decision in Schad v. Ari~ona?~ Schad was con- 
victed of first-degree murder. The prosecution proceeded on 
both premeditated- and felony-murder theories (Schad had 
stolen the victim's car). The judge refused Schad's request for 
an instruction on robbery as a lesser included offense, but did 
instruct on second-degree murder. The jury convicted of first- 
degree murder without specifying, or being asked to specify, 
whether it had convicted on the premeditated- or felony-murder 
theory. In an opinion by Justice Souter, the majority held that 
the refusal to instruct on robbery was not unconstitutional. A 
defendant is entitled to  a lesser included offense instruction in 
a capital case because of the possibility that a jury, convinced 
that the defendant had committed some violent crime but not 
convinced that he was gullty of a capital crime, might, without 
such an instruction, go ahead and convict of the capital offense 
86. 441 U.S. 953 (1979) (denial of certiorari). 
87. Id. at 953 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting MISS. 
CODE 8 97-3-19(2)(e) (1972)). 
88. Id. (quoting MISS. CODE 8 97-3-19(1)(a) (1972)). 
89. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
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if the only alternative was a~quittal.'~ The requirement of an 
instruction on a third option besides acquittal or conviction of a 
capital offense was satisfied here by the possibility of convic- 
tion on second-degree murder; the jury was not faced with an 
all-or-nothing choice. 
White's dissent rested on two propositions. First, robbery is 
a lesser included offense of felony murderlrobbery. The State 
contended that felony murder has no lesser included offenses. 
White pointed out, irrefutably, that "[iln the case of a com- 
pound crime such as felony murder, in which one crime must 
be proven in order to prove the other, the underlying crime 
must, as a matter of law, be a lesser included offense of the 
greater."" Second, second-degree murder is not a lesser in- 
cluded offense of felony murder; therefore the charge on that 
offense was only a third option beside acquittal or conviction of 
premeditated murder. In short, the second-degree murder 
charge did not provide the constitutionally required third op- 
tion besides conviction of felony murder and acquittal.g2 
Schad shows Justice White pursuing a logically rigorous 
analysis, focusing on the set-theoretical relationship of the 
elements of other crimes. It is the majority that takes the more 
"functional," good-enough-for-government-work approa~h.'~ 
One final case bears mention. The question in United 
States v. ~ i x o n ' ~  was whether a conviction for criminal con- 
tempt barred a subsequent prosecution for the criminal offense 
that was the basis of the contempt conviction. One of the defen- 
dants had been subject to  a civil protection order forbidding 
him to  assault his estranged wife; after doing just that he was 
tried for criminal contempt for violating the order, then on 
charges of assault and assault with intent to kill. The majority 
90. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980). 
91. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2512. 
92. Id. 
93. Justice Souter's response to White was that a jury would not be so "ir- 
rational" as to convict of capital murder rather than second-degree murder if it 
was unconvinced that the defendant had committed either first- or second-degree 
murder but was convinced he had committed robbery and so did not wish to let 
him off the hook entirely. There is something to this point as a purely descriptive 
matter. But if the evidence truly was insufficient to show that the defendant had 
deliberately killed the victim, while still indicating some violence and a theft, the 
charge closest to what the evidence established would be felony murder. (It is still 
true that this assumes that the jury is willing to ignore its reasonable doubt in- 
structions so far as to convict for felony murder, but not ignore its instructions on 
the elements of offenses so far as to convict for second-degree murder.) 
94. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). 
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held that the prosecution for simple assault was jeopardy- 
barred, since assault had to  be proved to establish violation of 
the protective order, but that prosecution for assault with in- 
tent to kill was not. White pointed out that simple assault was 
a lesser included offense of assault with intent to kill. Given 
the jury's opportunity to convict of any lesser included offense, 
and the likelihood that it would receive an instruction on the 
lesser included offense even if it was not charged, the 
majority's position amounted to  a rule that "while the govern- 
ment cannot, under the Constitution, bring charges of simple 
assault, it apparently can . . . secure a conviction for simple 
assault, so long as it prosecutes Foster for assault with intent 
to kill. As I see it, Foster will have been put in jeopardy twice 
for simple assault."g5 
In each of these cases, Justice White carefully and correct- 
ly applied a quantitative, greater-includes-the-lesser analysis, 
determining whether in fact the necessary overlap of the two 
offenses existed.96 - 
B. First Amendment Cases 
The most complex and interesting cases in which Justice 
White has relied on the argument that the greater includes the 
lesser have arisen under the First Amendment. Here White has 
repeatedly argued, usually in dissent, that a particular law is 
constitutional because it interferes with speech less than would 
a broader prohibition that is concededly constitutional. 
The most recent and prominent of these cases is R.A.V. u. 
City of St. This was a challenge to a city ordinance 
making it a crime to 
place[] on public or private property a symbol, object, appella- 
tion, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, 
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent- 
95. Id. at 2878 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
96. See also Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 158 (1977) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); cf Harmelin v. Michi- 
gan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2717 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting oddity of punish- 
ing possession of narcotics as severely as possession with intent to distribute, since 
the first is a lesser included offense of the latter). 
97. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
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ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.98 
As interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance 
reached only speech that qualified as "fighting words" under 
Supreme Court cases holding that such speech is unprotected 
by the First A~nendment.~~ Justice Scalia's opinion for the ma- 
jority struck down the ordinance on the ground that it was a 
content-based regulation of speech. Scalia relied on the exten- 
sive caselaw establishing that, if we know nothing else about 
the First Amendment, we know that it prohibits the govern- 
ment from allowing some speech and forbidding other speech 
solely because of agreement or disagreement with its content or 
viewpoint. 
Justice White's opinion concurring in the judgment100 
took a completely different tack, resting first and foremost on 
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. Under the Court's 
longstanding categorical approach to First Amendment cases, 
the ordinance prohibited unprotected speech. The fact that it 
did not apply to all unprotected speech did not make it invalid; 
the fact that St. Paul could forbid all fighting words (the great- 
er power) established that it could forbid some fighting words 
(the lesser power). 
To borrow a phrase, [the majority's] . . . "simplistic, all- 
or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is 
at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence a s  
well." It is inconsistent to hold that the government may 
proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of 
that speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a 
subset of that category differently without violating the First 
Amendment; the content of the subset is  by definition worth- 
less and undeserving of constitutional pr~tection.'~' 
98. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE 
8 292.02 (1990), quoted in RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at  2541. 
99. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
100. The opinion was a concurrence in the judgment because Justice White 
also considered the statute unconstitutional. While completely rejecting the 
majority's approach, White concluded that the statute was overbroad, reaching 
some protected speech notwithstanding the narrowing interpretation of the state 
supreme court. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. a t  2558-59 (White, J., concurring in the judg- 
ment). 
101. Id. at  2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted) 
(quoting id. at  2543 (majority opinion of Scalia, J.)). 
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Amendment cases, they are equal protection cases. More pre- 
cisely, the First Amendment argument is answered by the 
greater-includes-the-lesser response; the question that remains 
is one of equality, not freedom of speech.lo6 I will consider 
each in turn. 
1.  Selective regulation within an unprotected category 
The central case here is R.A.V. However, White's R.A.V. 
approach was anticipated by his opinion for the Court in New 
York v. Ferber,lo7 which upheld a state prohibition on child 
pornography. White distinguished child pornography from other 
non-obscene sexual materials on the ground that the state had 
a compelling interest in protecting minors who participated in 
the production of these materials (a rationale that White real- 
ized applied only to photographs and films, not written descrip- 
tions). Because of the harm to minors, child pornography fell 
into a new unprotected category. White then made quick work 
of the defendant's underinclusion argument: because child 
pornography was unprotected speech was such an argument 
was by definition unavailable.'" Under the greater-includes- 
the-lesser approach, underinclusion objections automatically 
fail. None of the concurring opinions took issue with this rea- 
soning although it is, of course, exactly White's argument in 
R.A. V. 
From a straight set-theoretic perspective, this approach is 
sound. To stick with the R.A.V. problem, the regulated fighting 
words are a subset of the (unprotected) category of all fighting 
words and therefore must themselves be unprotected. The key 
objection to the analysis, and the one Scalia dwells on, is that 
there is an independent constitutional prohibition on the exer- 
cise of the lesser power here. Yet given the Court's categorical 
oriented) shift in methodology will often not apply. As an illustration, in addition 
to this set of cases and those discussed supra notes 13-21, see also David H. 
Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 
785, 831-32 11.266 (1993) (noting that all the Justices who had participated in a 
1972 case and were still on the Court for a similar 1987 case "saw fit to take a 
different approach to the issue without sufficient explanation as to why their previ- 
ous opinion was not controlling, in need of reversal, or distinguishable. Only Jus- 
tice White's position [reflected in a separate concurrence in the first case] has some 
logical consistency."). 
106. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2555-56 & n.9 (1992) 
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
107. 458 US. 747 (1982). 
108. Id. at 765-66 & n.18. 
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approach to the First Amendment it is hard to say that that 
Amendment is such an independent prohibition. (At the very 
least, it is hard to see why content-based distinctions between 
unprotected speech merit strict scrutiny.) By definition the 
regulation applies to (and exempts some) speech that is of so 
little value as to merit no First Amendment protection at all. 
The equality-based concern that always arises here is ad- 
dressed by Justice White under the rubric of the Equal Protec- 
tion Clause, and he concludes that the legislature could reason- 
ably have decided that the speech it forbade was especially 
problematic. 
Interestingly, Justice White did not bring up what may be 
the strongest greater-includes-the-lesser argument in response 
to the majority. Scalia argues that if the state is going to  pro- 
scribe fighting words, it must proscribe all of them; it cannot 
pick and choose. Yet if that is the case, why is the line drawn 
at fighting words, the specific category of unprotected speech 
relevant under the Court's cases? Why isn't the statute still 
fatally underinclusive because it does not outlaw all unprotect- 
ed speech? Under Scalia's rationale, it should be unconstitu- 
tional to prohibit all fighting words but not, say, the dissemina- 
tion of information vital t o  national security; that would be 
content-based discrimination, and the fact that fighting words 
are constitutionally unprotected would make no difference 
given the decision to prefer other unprotected speech to fight- 
ing words.log Thus Scalia implicitly assumes that the greater 
does include the lesser: the state can forbid some but not all 
unprotected speech. He never explains why the magic catego- 
ries are those on the standard list of unprotected speech. 
Still, White's greater-includes-the-lesser logic is not com- 
pletely dispositive. White is in general hardly super-sensitive to 
First Amendment values and could be accused of shortchanging 
those values here, notwithstanding the protection that should 
109. Two responses are possible. First, perhaps St. Paul does forbid all unpro- 
tected speech except fighting words that are not hate speech. Even if i t  does, how- 
ever, one c a ~ o t  learn it from the majority opinion. Second, some sort of second- 
ary-effects argument may be available here; the legislature could reasonably con- 
clude that the harms flowing from fighting words are more severe than those flow- 
ing from, say, revealing classified information, not because it likes the message of 
classified information better. Yet it's not clear why that argument is not equally 
applicable to the St. Paul ordinance. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 
(1993) (upholding state law that enhances criminal penalties when victim is select- 
ed because of race). 
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be afforded by the company he kept-Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens. White does not fully address concerns 
about government manipulation of the free speech marketplace. 
Even when the government is preferring some unprotected 
speech to  other unprotected speech, the fact of government 
preference must give us pause. 
As a thought experiment, suppose the ordinance had for- 
bidden all fighting words except those that "arouse anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender." Under Justice Scalia's analysis, noth- 
ing changes; this is still a content-based distinction within an 
unprotected category and so unconstitutional. Is it also the 
same case under White's approach? The hypothetical tests our 
intuitive comfort with the result of White's approach in R.A.V. 
itself. As a First Amendment matter, such a law must be con- 
stitutional for White. The forbidden speech is unprotected; 
underinclusion is therefore irrelevant. However, I do not be- 
lieve he would vote to uphold it. Rather, he would strike it 
down on equal protection grounds. The objection to this ap- 
proach would be that evaluating such a law under the Equal 
Protection Clause instead of the First Amendment lowers the 
level of scrutiny. A statute as perverse as this hypothetical one 
would not survive, but many others would. 
The "equal protection component" of the First Amendment 
might be strong enough to require more searching scrutiny of 
unequal regulation even of unprotected speech. Professor 
Kagan concludes that content-based underinclusion should not 
trigger strict scrutiny but that viewpoint-based underinclusion 
(either direct or in effect) should.l1° Her argument is pow- 
erful. Whether it is ultimately right or not need not be resolved 
here. But it does suggest that the shortcoming of White's opin- 
ion is that it gives short shrift to the possible harms of content- 
or viewpoint-based regulation of unprotected speech. 
2. Selective funding of speech 
This type of case resembles those involving selective regu- 
lation of unprotected speech in that here again the speaker has 
no right to the subsidy, just as the speaker has no right to  
engage in unprotected speech, but the objection lies in the 
selective exercise of the state's undoubted power (to forbid 
110. Kagan, supra note 102, at 58-73. 
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unprotected speech, to refuse to subsidize). During his Supreme 
Court tenure, White was rather silent in these cases. He gener- 
ally joined opinions of other Justices that were consistent with 
his position in R.A.V., rejecting challenges to selective subsidies 
or conditions on subsidies. For example, he joined Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, upholding a 
federal prohibition on the use of federal funds for abortion 
counseling. Likewise, he joined Rehnquist's dissent in FCC u. 
League of Women Voters,"' which argued that the govern- 
ment could forbid radio stations receiving public funds from 
endorsing political candidates or editorializing.ll2 For 
Rehnquist this was a viewpoint-neutral limitation on how gov- 
ernment funds will be spent. 
White's votes in these cases may be overdetermined. They 
can be explained as reflections of his narrow understanding of 
First Amendment rights. But they also are consistent with his 
general confidence in the greater-includes-the-lesser proposition 
and his consistent application of it in First Amendment cases. 
3. Time, place, and manner restrictions 
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.l13 in- 
volved a municipal ordinance under which the Mayor had dis- 
cretionary authority t o  grant permits for newsracks on public 
property. Using Kagan's categories, this is a case involving the 
selective application of time, place, and manner restrictions. In 
an opinion by Justice Brennan, a 4-3 majority invalidated the 
ordinance as a prior restraint that gave the authorities unbri- 
dled discretion to engage in content-based discrimination 
against protected expre~sion."~ So characterized, the case 
was easy. Justice White rejected the characterization, however. 
For him, this was not constitutionally protected expression; the 
city could ban all newsracks. Therefore, as in R.A.V., in which 
the city could ban all fighting words, the possibility of govern- 
111. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). But see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
481 U S .  221 (1987) (parting company with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White 
joined Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court striking down a sales tax that ap- 
plied to some publications but not others rather than Justice Scalia's dissent). 
112. Rehnquist himself has not shown the same consistency between the differ- 
ent settings in which the content-based underinclusion problem arises, having 
joined Justice Scalia's opinion in RA.V. 
113. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
114. Id. at 772. 
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ment-drawn distinctions within the unprotected category was 
not threatening. l5 
Justice Brennan expressly rebuked Justice White for rely- 
ing on the "discredited" greater-includes-the-lesser argu- 
ment? Justice White denied that he was using such a n  
analysis a t  all.'l7 The denial is odd; it seems inescapable that 
Justice White was using this argument. What he was not do- 
ing, however, is using it in its "discredited," Holmesian form. 
Not every exercise of the lesser power would be automatically 
valid. White acknowledged, for example, that  the City could not 
grant newsracks only to Republicans. Because this was a facial 
challenge, however, it  was unnecessary and inappropriate to 
anticipate mayoral abuse of that sort. White's position was 
exactly that repeated in R.A.V. (and, for that matter, in Rust): 
allowing some speech and rejecting other speech is not per se 
impermissible under the First Amendment if none of the 
speech is protected.ll8 
Justice White's statement that the city could not grant 
newsrack licenses only to papers owned by a particular political 
115. Id. at 784 (White, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 762-69. 
117. Id. at 785-86 (White, J., dissenting). 
118. White's major premise-that the city could forbid newsracks altogether-is 
not necessarily correct. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council, 381 
F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (striking down ban on newsracks); Sandra L. Cobden, 
Note, Passive Communication in Public Fora: The Case for First Amendment Protec- 
tion of Newsracks, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 191 (1990) (arguing that a complete ban on 
newsracks in a public forum would be unconstitutional). If i t  is mistaken then the 
argument collapses. 
For another example of White's reliance on the greater-includes-the-lesser argu- 
ment in the public forum setting, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio- 
lence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (White, J.) (reasoning that because the Parks Service 
was under no obligation to allow a 24-hour vigil of protest on the Mall in Wash- 
ington, D.C., it necessarily had the power to allow the vigil but refuse to allow 
participants to sleep in their tents). 
A slight variation on Lakewood surfaced during White's last Term on the 
Court. In City of C i n c i ~ a t i  v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993), the 
Court struck down an ordinance that allowed newspapers to use newsracks but 
forbade "commercial handbills" to do so. The Court saw this as a content-based 
regulation that drew a distinction Raving nothing to do with the (concededly legiti- 
mate) aesthetic and safety concerns that underlay the ordinance. Justice White did 
not write an  opinion but joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Id. at 1521. 
Rehnquist argued that the Court had often upheld underinclusive regulations of 
commercial speech and justified the commerciaVnoncommercial distinction of the 
ordinance on the ground that the former enjoyed greater First Amendment protec- 
tion. Echoing Justice White's Lakewood dissent, he noted that the city could order 
the removal of all newsracks and described himself as  a t  a loss to understand why 
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it did not limit more speech. 
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party is notable. On the surface it conflicts with the strong 
version of the greaterAesser argument that he made in R.A.V. 
Two explanations for this arguable inconsistency are possible. 
First, i t  might be that for Justice White the greater-includes- 
the-lesser argument disposed of any First Amendment objec- 
tions, but racial or political distinctions would have been un- 
constitutional under the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e . " ~  Alterna- 
tively, White's position may be that equality requirements of 
the First Amendment are stronger when.speech is not in an 
unprotected category, such as fighting words. This is consistent 
with his emphasis in R.A.V. on the complete lack of value of 
the proscribed speech and the basic doctrinal proposition, with 
which he does not quarrel, that  a regulation can be upheld 
with a reasonable time, place, and manner limitation only if 
content-neutral. 
This second explanation, although never clearly articulated 
by Justice White, seems to me descriptively the most accurate 
and analytically the soundest. It reconciles White's dissent in 
Lakewood with his plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City 
of San Diego,l2' which to a large extent presaged the dis- 
agreements between the Justices in Lakewood. A city ordinance 
outlawed all outdoor advertising signs, with the exception of (a) 
on-site signs identifying the resident or advertising goods made 
on the premises and (b) a fairly narrow list of twelve types of 
signs, such as time and temperature signs and for-sale signs. 
With White writing for a four-Justice plurality, the Court 
struck down the ordinance as to noncommercial messages but 
upheld it as to commercial messages. The city could apply its 
ban to commercial signs, given the reduced protection enjoyed 
by commercial speech. As applied to non-commercial speech, 
however, the ordinance came to grief in two respects, both 
growing out of the exceptions to the general ban. First, the ex- 
ception for on-site signs designating the name of the owner or 
resident of the premises or advertising goods manufactured a t  
the premises, amounted to a broad exception for commercial 
speech without an  equivalent exception for non-commercial 
119. Some of White's language supports this reading: selling newspapers 
through newsracks "does not involve the exercise of First Amendment protected 
freedoms," but racial or political distinctions "would be clearly violative of the First 
Amendment (or some other provision of the Constitution)." City of Lakewood, 486 
U.S. at 786 (emphasis added). 
120. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
2271 THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER 263 
speech. This privileging of commercial speech was constitution- 
ally backward. In effect the ordinance treated the less protected 
category better than speech in  the more protected category. 
Second, the twelve specific exceptions violated the general 
requirement of content-neutrality. Because the distinctions 
were content-based, the law could not be upheld as  a reason- 
able time, place, and manner regulation.lZ1 
How would the greater-includes-the-lesser argument have 
operated here? We need not wonder, for Justice Stevens em- 
ployed just that argument in his dissent. He objected that the 
plurality "concludes that the ordinance is an  unconstitutional 
abridgment of speech because it does not abridge enough 
speech."122 Disagreeing with Justice Brennan, Stevens argued 
that a total ban on billboards would be constitutional because 
ample alternative channels of communication would remain 
available and the restriction would not in its intent or effect be 
especially burdensome for a particular subject or message. 
Because a total ban would be acceptable, a ban with some ex- 
ceptions must also be acceptable, since its burden on communi- 
cation is less serious than wouid be that of a total ban and the 
exceptions are not keyed to a particular subject or mes- 
sage. lZ3 
4. Non-p u blic fora 
White has taken the same approach to speech in a non- 
public forum. Thus, in Perry Education Ass'n v .  Perry Local 
Educators' A ~ s ' n , ' ~ ~  Justice White wrote the opinion for the 
Court upholding a school district's limitation of its interschool 
mail system to messages from the teachers' certified bargaining 
121. Id. at  516-17 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. He portrayed the law as a total ban 
and voted to strike it down because the asserted state interests in traffic safety 
and aesthetics were inadequate to outweigh this across-the-board ban on a particu- 
lar medium of communication. Id. at 527-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg- 
ment). 
122. Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also supra note 50 (de- 
scribing oral argument in LaDue v. Gilleo, No. 92-1856). 
123. Metromedia, Inc., 453 US. a t  542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
Stevens's position here is quite close to Professor Kagan's; content-based 
underinclusion is acceptable, viewpoint-based underinclusion receives strict scrutiny. 
Oddly, Stevens did not take this approach in RA-V., writing an opinion for himself 
only that focused on the relative harms flowing from the prohibited and permis- 
sible speech. 
124. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
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representative and denying it to a rival union. Because the 
mail system was not a public forum, reasonable "distinctions in 
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity" that  
would be "impermissible in a public forum" were "inherent and 
inescapable" and "wholly consistent with the District's legiti- 
mate interest in  'preserv[ing] the property . . . for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedi~ated.""~ 
5. Content-based regulation of protected speech 
This should be the easy First Amendment category. The 
most basic tenet of First Amendment doctrine is that the gov- 
ernment cannot choose which speech to permit and which to 
forbid on the basis of content.lZ6 This principle will often be 
inconsistent with the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. An 
across-the-board ban might well be acceptable, but a content- 
based selective prohibition will not. White characterized 
Metromedia as such a case. It is an uncomplicated instance of 
where the greater-includes-the-lesser argument fails because a 
separate constitutional prohibition forbids the exercise of the 
lesser power but not the greater."' 
The Court is not always careful in avoiding the great- 
erAesser argument in light of the prohibition on content-based 
regulation. For example, in New York State Liquor Authority v. 
Bel l~nca , '~~  it upheld a state law forbidding topless dancing 
where liquor is served. Were topless dancing unprotected ac- 
tivity, the case would be easy; even if not within the police 
power (which it surely is) or a violation of the dormant Com- 
merce Clause (which it almost certainly is not), the regulation 
is within the power granted to the states by the Twenty-First 
Amendment. The problem is that topless dancing is protected 
activity. The per curiam opinion simply ignored that fact, rea- 
125. Id. at 49, 50-51 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 (1981)). 
126. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend- 
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). 
127. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (1991) 
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that prohibition of public nudity was unconstitution- 
al  as  applied to nude dancing because it drew "a line between expressive conduct 
which is regulated and nonexpressive conduct of the same type which is not regu- 
lated" and so triggered strict scrutiny); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne- 
sota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that a use tax on paper and ink products was in- 
valid because it applied only to a few newspapers). 
128. 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam). 
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soning that the "power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages 
entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on 
premises where topless dancing occurs."129 Yet the Twenty- 
First Amendment cannot automatically authorize a state t o  
allow some expressive activity where alcohol is sold (plays, the 
opera, comedians, music) and not others. Only Justice Stevens 
dissented, but he was surely correct in arguing that the Twen- 
ty-First Amendment does not trump the First.lso After all, 
the Twenty-First would not sustain a law that allowed the sale 
of liquor to  whites but not blacks. The balance of interests may 
be different here, but the need to consider the First Amend- 
ment is no less than the need to consider the Fourteenth in 
that case. Here is one instance where White joined (or conceiv- 
ably wrote) an opinion with a clear abuse of the greater-in- 
dudes- the-lesser argument. 
C. "Content-Based Underinclusion" 
Outside the First Amendment 
The same principle behind the First Amendment opinions 
can be seen in other White opinions in which he makes the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument and rejects any equality- 
based responses. For example, in New York v. United 
States,13' the majority distinguished cases rejecting similar 
Tenth Amendment/federalism challenges t o  federal 
statutesls2 on the ground that in those cases Congress had 
regulated both the states and private entities identically. The 
law at issue in New York applied only to the states. White re- 
jected the distinction as not "logically ~ound," '~  arguing: 
[Tlhe Court makes no effort to explain why this purported 
distinction should affect the analysis of Congress' power un- 
der general principles of federalism and the Tenth Amend- 
ment. The distinction, facilely thrown out, is not based on any 
defensible theory. . . . An incursion on state sovereignty hard- 
ly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal stat- 
ute that "commands" specific action also applies to private 
parties. The alleged diminution in state authority over its 
129. Id. at 717. 
130. Id. at 718-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
131. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The case is summarized supra note 9. 
132. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 US .  528 (1985). 
133. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2441 (White, J., concurring in part and dissent- 
ing in part). 
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own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate re- 
stricts the activities of private parties.134 
White's rhetoric here is not exactly that of the greater and 
the lesser, for he does not present it as an instance in which 
the challenged action is "lesser" than the permissible one. In- 
stead he states that the two are the same. Nonetheless, the 
point is the same as in the First Amendment cases. The sub- 
stantive intrusion, whether on First or  Tenth Amendment 
rights, is identical regardless of how or whether it affects oth- 
ers. If it violates state sovereignty to force the state to take 
title t o  low-level radioactive waste, then it violates state sover- 
eignty; whether the regulation applies t o  others is simply irrel- 
evant. The underinclusion-here, regulating only states rather 
than states and private entities alike-is constitutionally irrele- 
vant. 
In most circumstances this approach leaves equality con- 
cerns unaddressed. However, given the peculiarity of a state 
asserting equal protection rights and the solid reasons for ap- 
plying the take-title obligation only to states, those are very far 
removed here. 
Without getting buried in the merits of this case, we might 
still note where White might have been mistaken. As in the 
First Amendment cases, the argument would be that he failed 
to acknowledge a normatively relevant aspect of underinclu- 
sion. Suspicion is generally appropriate if the outcome of the 
political process is to concentrate burdens on one major loser. If 
legislation must apply equally to  states and private interests 
alike, then that is some protection against such ganging up. 
Moreover, by ensuring that the states have some political al- 
lies, it would guarantee that the theory that states can protect 
themselves through the political process'35 actually holds up 
in practice. 
The same sort of criticism can be made of White's use of 
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument in Chadha, where 
that argument is used in a more straightforward way. The rele- 
vant passage is quoted above? White's point is that if Con- 
gress can hand its legislative responsibilities over to  the Attor- 
ney General entirely, it must be able to hand them over almost 
134. Id. 
135. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-54. 
136. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
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entirely, retaining some role for itself through the legislative 
veto. Yet a basic argument against congressional delegation is 
that policy decisions should be made in a visible manner by 
accountable officials. Delegations dilute accountability. If this is 
our concern, then White's implicit response is that it can only 
increase accountability to have the legislative veto; a little 
congressional involvement is better than none. The problem is 
that accountability may be even further diluted by the legisla- 
tive veto. It is always harder to pin down responsibility when 
its exercise is shared and invisible.13' 
Again, this Article is not going to take on the vitality of the 
Tenth Amendment or the constitutionality of the legislative 
veto. My only point is that without more the greaterflesser 
argument is usually incomplete. As discussed in Part 11, it is 
subject to misuse often enough that its use generally requires 
some explanation of why it is appropriate. In New York u. Unit- 
ed States and INS u. Chadha there are at  least plausible argu- 
ments that the "lesser" power may actually be the "greater" in 
that it creates even more of the problems associated with the 
"greater" than does the exercise of that power itself. 
D. Moving from the Lesser to the Greater 
A peculiar wrinkle on this style of argument is provided by 
Palmer u. Thomps~n, '~~ in which the Court, over Justice 
White's dissent, upheld the decision of Jackson, Mississippi t o  
close all its public swimming pools in the face of a judicial 
order to desegregate them. The situation might be seen as a 
classic greater-includes-the-lesser problem. Suppose Jackson 
segregates its pools. It argues that since it is not required to 
provide pools at all, it must be permitted to provide pools but 
on certain conditions, or only to certain people. Invoked to 
support racial classifications, that argument would be unan- 
imously rejected; indeed, this case only arose because courts 
had found Jackson's segregated pools unconstitutional. It is a 
stark example of the central fallacy of the greater-includes-the- 
137. One of the stronger aspects of Chief Justice Burger's opinion was his 
account of how the veto operated in practice. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-28 
(1983). Although this was totally irrelevant to his stated theory of the case, and 
although he relied in a somewhat obfuscatory fashion on its use in cases other 
than Chadha's, Burger's account is responsive to White. Indeed, it is the function- 
alist response to the most formalistic aspect of White's opinion. 
138. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
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lesser argument; quantitative change may also involve a quali- 
tative change. 
The fact that the greater does not include the lesser here 
seems to suggest that the majority was correct in Palmer. The 
Court properly did not assume a correspondence of the whole 
and the parts, realizing that just because the lesser was invalid 
did not mean that the greater was as well. The error would 
have been one of composition rather than division, but the 
principle is the same. 
Was Justice White incorrect, then, in linking the lesser and 
the greater in Palmer, in failing to recognize that they were 
different? I think not. The heart of his dissent was a focus on 
"evidence of invidious purpose or motive"13g and the fact that 
closing all pools involved precisely the same stigmatizing mes- 
sage about black inferiority present in the decision to segregate 
pools. In short, in these circumstances, the greater did include 
the lesser; "composition" was not a fallacy. 
Another example of the same form of reasoning is Justice 
White's dissent in Ingraham v. Wright.140 There the Court re- 
jected Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment challenges to corpo- 
ral punishment of schoolchildren. It held that the Eighth 
Amendment simply does not apply to school discipline; by "pun- 
ishment" the Amendment refers only to criminal  sanction^.'^^ 
Justice White disagreed. If, he reasoned, there are some pun- 
ishments that are so barbaric that they may not be imposed for 
the commission of crimes-those acts that society designates as 
the most thoroughly reprehensible a person can commit-then 
similar punishments may not be imposed on persons for less 
culpable acts, such as breaches of .school rules. If it is uncon- 
stitutional to cut off someone's ear for committing murder, it 
must be unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for being late to 
class. 14' 
Like the Palmer v. Thompson dissent, this is a greater- 
includes-the-lesser argument, but not in the normal direction. 
Prohibition of the lesser necessarily implies prohibition of the 
139. Id. at 241 (White, J., dissenting). 
140. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
141. Id. at 668-71. As to the due process claim, the Court held that while 
students had a liberty interest in being free from corporal punishment, after-the- 
fact state tort remedies provided all the process that was due. Id. at 672-74, 676- 
80. 
142. Id. at 684 (White, J., dissenting). 
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greater; if the government cannot do X, then it cannot do 
2X. 143 
The primary objection to White's reasoning would be the 
usual one: that the shift from greater to lesser (or, as here, 
from lesser to greater) is not simply quantitative but qualita- 
tive. That is one way of describing the majority's claim that 
what happens in schools does not count as "punishment." To 
illustrate, suppose we accept Ingraham and reverse the argu- 
ment. Say the state sought t o  impose corporal punishment for 
theft. It might argue, citing Ingraham, that if the state can 
impose such punishment on school pupils it surely can impose 
it on criminals, where the justification is greater and the harm 
slighter. Among the objections to this argument would be the 
standard one that the greater does not include the lesser here 
because a particular constitutional prohibition-the Eighth 
Amendment-applies to the lesser (because it is criminal pun- 
ishment) and not the greater. For present purposes, we need 
not resolve the dispute over the meaning of "punishmentyy in 
the Eighth Amendment. I would make only two points. First, 
White's use of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument (or, 
more precisely, the argument that the lesser is included within 
the greater) is wholly appropriate here given his premises. 
Second, that argument is at least relevant, though not disposi- 
tive, to the question of the scope of "puni~hment,'~ because it 
helps achieve an overall legal regime of principle and coher- 
ence. 
A second objection to White's reliance on the greaternesser 
idea is also possible. Precisely because of the deep societal 
approbation of, say, murder as compared to its view of, say, 
tardiness for class, a prohibition of cruel and unusual punish- 
ments is less necessary in the school discipline setting than in 
the criminal justice setting. It is not at all clear, however, that 
(setting aside vigilante justice) the state does in fact have a 
greater tendency to go overboard in punishing criminals than 
in punishing schoolchildren. 
143. Another example in a White opinion is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), in which the Court held that reporters could be required to appear before a 
grand jury. 
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E. White Opinions Rejecting Greater /Lesser Arguments 
Justice White's last opinion for the Court was in United 
States u. Edge Broadcasting CO., '~~ upholding a statute pro- 
hibiting the broadcast of any lottery advertisement by a radio 
station located in a state without a state-run lottery. The Solic- 
itor General argued that because Congress and the states had 
the power to outlaw lotteries altogether, they necessarily had 
the lesser power to forbid the advertising of 10tteries.l~~ With- 
out explanation, Justice White declined to address that issue, 
proceeding instead with a straightforward application of the 
commercial speech decisions. The opinion is a farewell remind- 
er that (as we saw in Metromedia) White was by no means 
fixated on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument.146 This 
section looks at some of the other situations in which he has 
rejected this approach. 
1.  The greater power does not exist 
The first requirement of any greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument is, of course, that the major premise is correct, i.e. 
144. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). 
145. The argument derives directly from thedustice Rehnquist's opinion up- 
holding Puerto Rim's ban on casino advertising. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tour- 
ism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
146. In my view the government's argument in Edge was flatly wrong and the 
Court appropriately refused to go down that path. In the speech cases discussed in 
Part III.B, supra, the greater power was always a power to curtail speech. Here 
the asserted greater power is a general regulatory authority over (constitutionally 
unprotected) conduct. The concern over the sort of qualitative shift that undoes the 
greaterAesser argument should thus be far greater. 
In this situation a constitutional prohibition applies to the exercise of the sup- 
posedly lesser power that does not apply to the exercise of the greater. As one 
judge with impeccable conservative credentials has written about the Posadas dic- 
tum on which the government relied: "[IN is not clear that the power to regulate a 
specific economic activity necessarily comprises the power to regulate speech about 
that activity. After all, the Constitution does not forbid legislation abridging the 
freedom of gambling; it does forbid legislation abridging the freedom of speech." 
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's m i d  of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627, 649 n.74 (1990). 
The point is clearest if one posits a law that forbids public discussion or "ab- 
stract advocacy" of gambling or lotteries. No one would make the greater-includes- 
the-lesser argument as to such a law. The appropriateness of that argument is no 
greater when the forbidden speech is advertising. Even though under the commer- 
cial speech cases one might plausibly uphold the prohibition of advertising and not 
of abstract advocacy, the usual First Amendment analysis is still required. Indeed, 
this application of the greater-includes-the-lesser approach would in effect eliminate 
constitutional protection of commercial speech. 
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that the greater authority does indeed exist. This is the sim- 
plest and most direct basis on which to reject any particular 
application of the argument. Justice White himself is open to  
that criticism in the Lakewood case, although the substantive 
issue is one far beyond my interests here.'47 In at least one 
case, White rejected a greater-includes-the-lesser argument on 
this basis. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakina Indian Nation148 the question was whether an Indian 
tribe could impose its zoning regulations on non-Tribe members 
who owned land within the reservation. There was no opinion 
for the Court. In one opinion, Justice Stevens relied on the 
treaty between the United States and the Tribe to argue that 
the Tribe had the authority wholly to exclude outsiders from 
the reservation, and therefore necessarily possessed the author- 
ity to allow them into the reservation but regulate their use of 
land therein.'*' Justice White seemed sympathetic t o  
Stevens's greater-includes-the-lesser approach, but he rejected 
the premise.150 Notwithstanding the treaty, the Tribe lacked 
power to exclude from lands that, pursuant to  federal statute, 
had been sold in fee to non-members of the Tribe. The greater- 
includes-the-lesser argument collapsed because the greater 
power simply did not exist. 
Seth Kreimer has argued that the greater-includes-the- 
lesser argument should be unavailable whenever the govern- 
ment would never in fact exercise a purely theoretical greater 
authority.151 In essence, this argument is that (de facto rath- 
er than de jure) the supposed greater authority does not exist. 
As discussed above, this may not be such a telling criticism of 
the argument.152 But in any event I am unaware of Justice 
White ever relying on a purely theoretical greater power. To 
the contrary, in Chadha, for example, he argued that if Con- 
gress can hand over legislative decisionmaking in its entirety to 
an agency it must be able to hand it over almost completely, re- 
taining a veto.153 Standardless delegations are of course a 
fact of life in the administrative state, and the "greater power" 
See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Id. at 423-27 (opinion of White, J.). 
Kreimer, supra note 53, at 1313-14. 
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
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to which White referred was the power that the majority was 
endorsing, indeed requiring. 
White's reliance on real rather than theoretical greater 
powers is not surprising. As discussed in Part I, all of White's 
jurisprudence rests there? The logical approach I am dis- 
cussing in this Article is not divorced from the functionalism on 
which others have focused; the two are not just consistent, they 
are interconnected, and each operates ii the service of the 
other.'55 
2. The public forum 
The public forum doctrine, which limits government's au- 
thority to control the use of its own property, is itself a rejec- 
tion of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. After all, one 
could argue that because the government need not create 
parks, sidewalks, post-offices and so on in the f i s t  place it 
must therefore have the lesser authority to create them but 
limit their use. So Justice Holmes (of the Massachusetts Su- 
preme Judicial Court) argued in Davis.'56 The legal conclu- 
sion that certain property is a public forum is the logical con- 
clusion that the greater does not include the lesser. But why 
doesn't it? In the terms of Part 11, two things seem to be at 
work. First, if the greater-includes-the-lesser argument is de- 
fective when there is no realistic possibility that the govern- 
ment will exercise its theoretical greater power, the public 
forum cases are an excellent example. The government is not 
going to eliminate parks and sidewalks altogether. Second, the 
state's justification for its exercise of the lesser power is weaker 
than that for its exercise of the greater power.''' The reasons 
for not having streets and p a r k e l a t e d  to  expense, resource 
154. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text. 
155. Cf Allan Ides, Letter to the Editors, NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 4, 
4 (noting that Justice White sought "not to promote particular ideologies, but to 
decide cases in a pragmatic way that permits the political branches to shoulder 
primary responsibility for governing our society" and that the goal of an opinion 
was "to decide the case in an intellectually and analytically sound manner") (em- 
phasis added). 
156. "[Tlhe legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the pub- 
lic place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the 
less [sic] step of limiting the public use to certain purposes." Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
157. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
2271 THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER 273 
allocation, and opportunity costs-are not applicable to denying 
their use for First Amendment activity once they exist. 
By accepting the public forum doctrine at all then (which 
concededly is hardly a radical move) White properly rejects a 
strong version of the greater-includes-the-lesser idea. Still, 
while by no means contending that there was no such thing as 
a public forum, and not writing many opinions in this area,lss 
White consistently voted with whichever set of Justices took 
the narrower view of the scope of the public forum 
doctrine.159 This is of course consistent with his relatively 
narrow understanding of First Amendment rights; it is also 
consistent with the greater-includes-the-lesser idea. One won- 
ders whether his relatively unsympathetic view of public forum 
arguments might not stem at least in part from the fact that 
the whole idea of the public forum is inconsistent with the 
argument that the greater includes the lesser. 
3. Equality 
In McLaughlin u. Florida,160 Justice White wrote the 
opinion for the Court striking down Florida's prohibition on 
interracial fornication. Separate statutory provisions forbade 
(1) adultery, (2) unmarried cohabitation or "open and gross 
lewdness and lascivious behavior," and (3) fornicati~n.~~' In 
addition, another provision made it a crime for "any white 
person and negro, or mulatto" to "live in adultery or fornication 
with each other" and for any such couple to "habitually live in 
and occupy in the nighttime the same room."162 The appel- 
lants were found guilty of violating this last section. A unani- 
158. In addition to Perry, his best-known opinion for the Court in a public- 
forum case is Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 
US. 640 (1981)' which also rejected a First Amendment challenge. 
159. See, e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 
S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority 
upholding airport ban on solicitation); Lee v. International Society for Krishna Con- 
sciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992) (White joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent from per curiam opinion striking down airport ban on the dis- 
tribution of literature); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (White 
joined Justice Ke~edy ' s  opinion upholding ban on loud music in park); Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (White joined Justice Stewart's opinion upholding mili- 
tary base regulations forbidding political demonstrations and requiring headquarters 
approval for the posting of any publication). 
160. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
161. Id. at 185 n.1. 
162. Id. 
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mous Court reversed the conviction under the Equal Protection 
Clause. This predecessor to Loving u. Virginia1" is barely a 
footnote in the history of the Court's cases concerning racial 
discrimination. However, it is a stark (and easy) illustration of 
equality concerns overriding the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument. The Court did not even hesitate with regard to the 
state's power to forbid adultery and fornication generally. But 
the Court did not conclude that because the state can forbid all 
such behavior (as indeed it had), it must be able to forbid some. 
That argument does not work: 
This is not . . . a case where the class defined in the law is 
that from which "the evil mainly is to be feared," or where the 
"lelvils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies," or even one where 
the State has done as much as it can as fast as  i t  can. That a 
general evil will be partially corrected may a t  times, and 
without more, serve to justify the limited application of a 
criminal law; but legislative discretion to employ the piece- 
meal approach stops short of permitting a State to narrow 
statutory coverage to focus on a racial group. Such classifica- 
tions bear a far heavier burden of justifi~ation.'~~ 
Three points can be made about this passage. First, it is 
stylistically typical of Justice White: restrained, deadpan, not 
especially memorable, but clear, fum, and useful. Second, it is 
methodologically typical, reflecting a heavy reliance on prece- 
dent and care not to go further than necessary.165 Third, and 
most relevant to present purposes, it avoids the one-step-at-a- 
time trap. The greater-includes-the-lesser argument only works 
if the resulting selective treatment can be justified. Here it 
obviously cannot; especially seen from 1994 the point is not a 
subtle one. But the awareness of equality concerns in the great- 
er-includes-the-lesser setting is constant in White's opin- 
ions. 
163. 388 US. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia anti-miscegenation statute). 
164. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 194 (citations omitted). 
165. In both style and method, Justice Stewart's more stirring and condemning 
concurrence is a strong contrast. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
166. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2556 & n.9 (1992) 
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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4. Substance and procedure 
The most prominent example of Justice White rejecting the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument is in the procedural due 
process setting. The Due Process Clause applies only when 
there is a deprivation of "life, liberty or property."167 Life and, 
t o  some extent, liberty have meanings independent of the re- 
quirements of positive law, but the definition of "property" is 
wholly a matter of positive law. Thus, the antecedent re- 
quirement triggering due process is left entirely up to the state: 
it can choose to create a property right in a particular interest 
or not. If the state has the power to create or not to create 
property in the first place, it would seem also to have the lesser 
power t o  define the procedures for the deprivation of those 
property interests it does create. In the much-quoted phrase of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, it can force the property owner to 
"take the bitter with the sweet."168 
The government employment cases illustrate the argu- 
ment. The government can create a property interest in em- 
ployment by limiting the permissible bases for termination. But 
it need not do so; should the state choose to hire at-will em- 
ployees, nothing in the Constitution would forbid it, and then 
the Due Process Clause would not apply to  termination, since 
no property interest would be at stake?' If the government 
can make an employee terminable at will, then logically it 
should be able to place the employee in a better position by 
adopting a for-cause standard for termination though specifying 
procedures for termination that fall short of "due process." 
Commentators have generally seen this logic as irrefutable.170 
Indeed, this is logic that Justice White and others have 
accepted in other settings. The procedural due process problem 
has a counterpart in the criminal area. Here too the Constitu- 
167. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, $ 1. 
168. Arnett v. K e ~ e d y ,  416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by 
two other Justices on this point). 
169. Compare Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), 
with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
170. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DIS- 
TOWS PUBLIC POLICY 135 (1989) (stating that "the logical implication" of leaving 
the definition of property to the state is that the state is likewise free to deter- 
mine the level of due process protection); Karen H. Flax, Liberty, Property, and the 
Burger Court: The Entitlement Doctrine in Transition, 60 TUL. L. REV. 889, 918-19 
(1986) ("[Sltrictly speaking, the entitlement doctrine does entail Rehnquist's 'hitter 
with the sweet' theory."). 
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tion imposes procedural limitations through the Due Process 
Clause but leaves it to the state to  define the substantive pred- 
icates for the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. For exam- 
ple, the state has the authority to define the elements of the 
crime of murder; the Due Process Clause then imposes the 
procedural obligation to prove each element beyond a reason- 
able doubt.17' However, the state can accept that burden by 
defining something (for example, sanity) as an element of the 
crime, or avoid it by defining the same element (now insanity) 
as an aff"1rmative defense and so requiring that the defendant 
prove it. As long as the Constitution is silent as to the elements 
of the crime or the need for a particular affirmative defense, 
which it generally is, then the state can allocate burdens of 
proof as it sees fit. Indeed, a greater-includes-the-lesser argu- 
ment supports this conclusion: the state need not create a par- 
ticular affirmative defense in the first place, it therefore has 
the lesser power to create the defense but place the burden of 
proving it on the defendant. 
This argument has been stated most squarely by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist,'" but can also be found in Justice White's 
opinions, particularly Patterson v. New Y ~ r k . ' ~ ~  In Patterson a 
defendant who had been convicted of murder challenged the 
state's requirement that he had to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence "extreme emotional disturbance" in order to re- 
duce the crime to manslaughter. He argued that under In re 
Winship the state had to prove the absence of extreme emotion- 
al disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice White rea- 
soned that the state was under no constitutional obligation to 
expand the old common law defense of heat-of-passion in the 
way it had; that it had done so only because it could place the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant; and that the state was 
not faced with the all-or-nothing choice of either recognizing no 
such defense or having to disprove its e~istence. '~~ The great- 
171. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
172. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 633 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). The defendant in Lockett had argued that in order 
to impose the death sentence the state had to consider all possible mitigating fac- 
tors and to prove their absence beyond a reasonable doubt. ThenJustice Rehnquist 
made quick work of the latter argument: "Because I continue to believe that the 
Constitution is not offended by the State's refusal to consider mitigating factors at 
all, there can be no infirmity in shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant 
when it chooses to consider them." Id. 
173. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
174. Id. at 206-10. 
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er-includes-the-lesser argument is more implicit than explicit; 
but lurking beneath the surface is the idea that the fact that 
the state did not have to create the defense in the first place 
means that it can create it but adopt a procedural rule that in 
effect renders the defense less helpful to or protective of the 
defendant. '75 
The bitter-with-the-sweet theory is not obviously different. 
Nonetheless, Justice White has consistently rejected Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's argument,'76 and authored -the opinion 
for the Court in the decision that finally flatly rejected it, 
Cleveland Board of Education v. L~uderrnill. '~~ 
The easy way out of the "positivist trap"'78 revealed by 
the bitter-with-the-sweet argument would be to hold that the 
greater power in fact does not exist. This might be done in 
three ways. First, if the entitlements doctrine were rejected, 
then the states would not be free to define "property" for pur- 
poses of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, there is a sort of a 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument against the entitlements 
doctrine: if the Constitution removes the "lesser" power of de- 
termining procedures for deprivation from the state, then sure- 
ly it must also remove the greater power of defining the sub- 
stantive scope of the entitlement. However, while the 
entitlements doctrine has received a quite hostile scholarly 
re~eption, '~~ neither the Court as a whole nor Justice White 
in particular has shown any sign of being ready to  abandon it. 
Second, the greater power does not exist if the Constitution 
or natural law imposes affirmative obligations on the state to  
create or respect certain property rights. Some scholars make 
175. Justice Blackmun has described the Patterson rationale in exactly these 
terms: "[Slince the State constitutionally could decline to recognize the defense a t  
all, i t  could take the lesser step of placing the burden of proof upon the defen- 
dant." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 681 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 
also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (White, J., concurring) 
(joining Court in setting aside requirement that jury be unanimous in finding miti- 
gating circumstances, but writing separately to note that state can place burden of 
persuasion as to mitigating circumstances on the defendant). 
176. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-94 (1980) (White, J.); Bishop v. Wood, 
426 U.S. 341, 355-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 
572-84 (1975) (White, J.); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 177-86 (1974) (White, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
177. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
178. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Digni- 
tary Theory, 61  B.U. L. REV. 885, 888-93 (1981). 
179. For one of many examples, see the discussion and citations in Cynthia R. 
Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991). 
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such an argument, and in some of the takings cases under the 
Fifth Amendment the Court seems hesitant to yield the state 
a n  unfettered power to define property. However, the Court has 
been wholly reluctant to discover affirmative rights in the Con- 
stitution in general1'' or to adopt a substantive due process 
regime in which individuals would have affirmative rights to 
property, "new" or old.181 
Third, the greater power might be said to exist in theory 
only. Even if this objection to the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument is valid, however, it does not apply in all the proce- 
dural due process cases. While it is quite certain, for example, 
that the federal and state governments could not in practice 
eliminate "welfare" across the board, they can and do make 
significant adjustments to the relevant programs. 
Accepting the existence of the greater power to define sub- 
stantively protected interests, then, why doesn't the State have 
the lesser power to define the procedures by which i t  deprives 
those interests it deigns to create? Loudermill gives only a 
partial explanation: 
[Tlhe Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive 
rights-life, liberty, and property+annot be deprived except 
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The catego- 
ries of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule 
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. 
"Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for 
its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.182 
Several ideas seem to be a t  work here. One is purely practical. 
This passage comes close to a concession that the Court has 
backed itself into a corner with the entitlements doctrine. To 
avoid writing the Due Process Clause out of the Constitution 
insofar as it protects property the Court had to reject the bit- 
ter-with-the-sweet idea. The Constitution inescapably antici- 
pates some limits on the procedures by which the state de- 
prives property; if no process was "due" then the Clause is 
meaningless. 
180. See generally Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990). 
181. See Colin S. Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1542 (1985) 
(reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985)). 
182. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
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Furthermore, reconsider the criminal procedure cases dis- 
cussed above. The Rehnquist position in a case like Lockett is 
that because the state need not provide for consideration of 
mitigating circumstances at  all, it is free to place the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant. Note that he does not generalize 
the point. Applying the bitter-with-the-sweet doctrine to  crimi- 
nal cases would mean that because the state is free to define 
the elements of a crime it is free to determine the procedures 
by which those elements are established. Even Rehnquist does 
not believe that, and very thick books about constitutional 
criminal procedure show that the Court does not. The state's 
freedom t o  establish the substantive grounds for depriving life 
or liberty does not include the lesser power to determine the 
procedures for doing so. 
The criminal setting may be distinguishable from procedur- 
al due process settings such as welfare benefits or government 
employment. Life and liberty, unlike property, have a constitu- 
tional meaning separate from state positive law; positive law 
only defines when they will be lost. In the property setting 
positive law does double duty: it simultaneously defines what is 
property and establishes the substantive basis for the depriva- 
tion. This distinction does not defeat the criminal law analogy, 
however. For one thing, the requirements of constitutional 
criminal procedure apply even where the sanction is only a 
criminal fine, which deprives the defendant of something (mon- 
ey) that is only property because positive law says it is. More- 
over, the power to define the elements of a crime, even though 
distinct from the power to determine what constitutes the pro- 
tected interest that will be deprived as a consequence of com- 
mitting the crime, is nonetheless a "greater" power than the 
authority to determine procedures. Therefore, the bitter-with- 
the-sweet argument should still apply. 
Finally, the insistence in Loudermill that substance and 
procedure are distinct recalls the example in Part I1 about 
maximum and minimum speed limits on the superhigh- 
way? Although they are enormously interconnected and the 
rules of one always have consequences for the other, substance 
and procedure are distinct. To invoke the vocabulary of this 
Article, there are important qualitative differences between the 
"greater" and "lesser" powers here. Regardless of the state's au- 
183. See supra p. 22. 
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thority to define the scope of substantive entitlement, process 
serves important and distinct functions-both in ensuring accu- 
racy and in serving more amorphous "process values"-that 
would be lost in the easy calculation that the greater includes 
the lesser. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The argument that the greater includes the lesser is often 
valid, but slippery and dangerous. If its underlying assump- 
tions-that the greater power really does exist, that the lesser 
power is really included within it, and that there is no qualita- 
tive difference between the two-are unexamined, the argu- 
ment is easily misused. Whenever the argument is invoked, 
those assumptions must be investigated. 
A few reservations and a few conclusions with regard to 
Justice White. First, I have not necessarily shown that Justice 
White had a particular fondness for this argument. Maybe 
what I have shown is only that he sat on the Court for thirty- 
one years. That's a long time, during which a Justice is likely 
to trot out any particular argument more than once. Again, I 
have not done any thorough research into the relative frequen- 
cy with which different Justices invoke this argument, which is 
a standard lawyer's and judge's move. I can only say that I 
come away from this examination convinced that the greater- 
includes-the-lesser is an important idea for Byron White. 
Second, I have not necessarily shown that this argument 
affected the way White decided cases. It may only have affected 
the way he wrote opinions. As always the overlap of the stated 
argument and the underlying bases of the decision is uncertain. 
In my view, Justice White generally follows where the argu- 
ment leads. He may think there is something wrong with the 
argument if it leads him to the wrong place, and therefore 
rethink it, but argument and logical consistency are important 
to him. But if you think ideology explains decisions and opin- 
ions are always ex post rationalizations, I have said nothing to 
convince you otherwise. 
Third, as I said at the outset, the foregoing account is 
misleadingly incomplete. It is not by any means a full picture 
of White's jurisprudential method. I offer it as only a part of 
the picture, and a small part at that, but a neglected one. 
What, then, does this tell us about Byron White's jurispru- 
dence? I would stress three things. First, it reminds us of his 
analytic, logically rigorous approach to legal argument. For all 
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the focus on White's real-world pragmatism and desire for 
facts, it is equally important to White to think things through 
to ensure a logical coherence. Indeed, the strongest criticism of 
his opinions in the cases I have discussed is that they are not 
functionalist enough. By invoking this logical approach, White 
avoids considering hard questions about how things operate in 
practice: does selective limitation of unprotected speech in 
practice skew the free speech marketplace, even though it is 
"less than" a broader but more neutral restriction? Does the 
legislative veto in practice decrease accountability, even though 
it is "less than" a broader delegation from elected to unelected 
officials? And so on. 
Second, these cases show that White was much more sensi- 
tive to equality arguments than to  arguments about absolute 
limits on government power. Where he ignores a possible great- 
er-includes-the-lesser argument it is usually because he is 
sensitive to the equality issues. When he accepts the argument, 
it is with a recognition that there may be equality objec- 
tions. lS4 
Finally, Justice White's treatment of the proposition that 
the greater includes the lesser shows care and precision in his 
thinking, a nonideological approach to  deciding cases, and a 
striking consistency of his method. In these characteristics, it is 
a wholly typical example of his work. 
184. The same dynamic can be found in White's consistent rejection of First 
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws. On the one hand, White was un- 
sympathetic to the First Amendment argument, on the other, he stressed the need 
for equal opportunity for participation in the democratic process. 
